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The Secured Party and Default
Proceedings Under the UCC
The Uniform Commercial Code, already enacted in many
states, is currently before the Minnesota legislature. Anal-
yses of the operation of the Code are, therefore, both time-
ly and important, especially to members of the Minnesota
bar. In this Article, Professor Hogan examines the con-
cept of default under the Code and analyzes the various
means of enforcing secured claims by proceedings within
the control of the secured party. Then, after considering
certain specialized problems, he deals with enforcement
by judicial proceedings. Professor Hogan concludes that
although a sound evaluation of the Code's treatment of
default proceedings must await further case development,
the Code establishes the first integrated system for reali-
zation by secured parties, and promotes flexibility and ef-
ficiency in the realization procedure.
Wifliam E. Hogan*
The secured creditor who at the outset of a transaction pur-
posely plans a definite foreclosure upon the collateral is usually
either a knave or a fool. In consumer finance transactions, there
is evidence that some unscrupulous lenders do structure their
arrangements to trigger default, repossession, and resale at an
exorbitant rate.' On the other hand, the pawnbroker is really the
only legitimate lender who can regularly extend credit to poor
risks, taking comfort in his ability to collect his debt from the
collateral. Assuring repayment of the indebtedness, and not re-
alization upon the collateral, is the main object of any sensible
lender. The honest secured creditor will usually find that realiza-
tion upon the collateral merely increases his administrative ex-
penses and reduces his over-all profit.2 Actually, default proceed-
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
1. BLAcK, Buy Now, PAY LATR 124 (1961); Warren, Statutory Damages
and the Conditional Sale, 20 OHio ST. L.J. 289, 315-16 nn.114-15 (1959).
2. An attempt by the secured party to recover a share of his overhead
costs for the realization will probably be met by a rule of damages limiting
recovery to the cost and expenses directly attributable to repossession and
resale. Shepherd Tractor & Equip. Co. v. Page, 158 F.2d 655 (5th Cir.
1947); Cherner v. Lawson, 162 A.2d 492 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1960).
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ings are at best a means of salvage, aimed at reducing some losses,
not at eliminating all of them. Even where the collateral is quite
liquid in form, the debtor will probably be lost as a customer3
Since such proceedings may actuate other creditors, the secured
party may find himself in a dispute with a trustee in bankruptcy
or with governmental units claiming priority over his claim. The
law of priorities is so complex and intricate that the creditor may
well lose no matter how careful he has been in complying with the
formal requisites of chattel security law.4
The lawyer for the secured party must, however, concern him-
self with the prospect that trouble may overtake this particular
transaction. In preparing standard forms, in drafting the tailor-
made contract, and in advising as to procedures upon default,
counsel can minimize the woe attendant upon the realization proc-
ess. It is here that the value of any security is put to the hard
practical test. No matter how beautifully synthesized the scholar
3. The "loss-of-a-customer" argument is probably more telling in the
business transaction than in the consumer loan. This fact may partially
account for the large number of nonbusiness bankruptcies (131,402) as
compared to the much smaller number of proceedings aimed at business
debtors (15,241) during the last report year. 1961 DIR. AD. OFFICE U.S.
CTS. ANN. REP. 211.
4. Under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6321, a tax lien arises on all
"property," or "right to property," of any person neglecting or refusing
to pay any tax after demand. Recently in United States v. Crest Fin. Co.,
291 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), vacated, 368 U.S. 347 (1961), rev'd, 302 F.2d 568
(7th Cir. 1962), the secured creditor was forced to travel to the court of
appeals, then to the Supreme Court, and finally back to the court of ap-
peals to vindicate his security interest as against the tax lien. The Govern-
ment had argued that the security interest in assigned accounts receivable
was not sufficiently "choate" to come ahead of the federal tax lien. In the
Supreme Court the Government shifted its position, conceding that the
lien of the secured creditor was sufficiently "choate," and the Court re-
versed and remanded. Somewhat concerned by the shifting of position.
the circuit court of appeals found the lien to be choate. 47 CORNELL
L.Q. 308 (1962); 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 521 (1961). Law review comment
on the entire problem has been critical of the extremely advantageous
position of the Government. Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal
Government: The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate General Lien, 63
YAI_E L.J. 905 (1954); MacLachlan, Improving the Law of Federal Liens
and Priorities, I B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 73 (19591; Meyers, The Fall
and Rise of the Security Interest, PRAc. LAW., Dec. 1960, p. 60; Plumb,
Federal Tax Collection and Lien Problems, 13 TAx L. REV. 247 (1958);
Reeve, The Relative Priority of Government and Private Liens, 29 ROCKY
MT. L. REV. 167 (1957). The MacLachlan piece describes the attempts
to revise the statutory scheme for the federal collection system. See ABA,
FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL LIENS (1959). The bank-
ruptcy problems are extensively discussed in two excellent articles. Hanna,
The Secured Creditor in Bankruptcy, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 471 (1960);
Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy Under the Uniform Commercial
Code: Some Problems Suggested by Articles 2 and 9, 14 RUTGERS L.
REV. 518 (1960).
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may consider the Code's rules on priorities,' after-acquired prop-
erty,6 dominion over the collateral, or notice filing,' the Code
fails as a practical matter unless it effectively promotes an ef-
ficient, fair, and prompt means for the payment of the debt by
resort to the collateral. It is in this light that this paper attempts
to analyze Part 5 of Article 9 and the related sections of the Code
that treat the problems arising when there is a "default under a
security agreement."
The Code sets out to accomplish two goals. First, to assure the
highest possible realization price, a considerable discretion is con-
ferred upon the secured party seeking to realize upon his col-
lateral.9 There is a remarkable absence of stringent requirements
for mandatory public sales, detailed public notices, or other specif-
ic prohibitions. For the most part, the Code requires only that
the secured party must be "commercially reasonable" in making
the disposition. Second, the Code aims at increasing the ability
of a court to review the conduct of the secured party in the dis-
position of the collateral.1" An explicit statutory grant permits
the court to interfere prospectively with dispositions that will
violate the Code requirements and to require the payment of mon-
ey damages when the defective dispositions have already occurred."
The Code generally allows modification of its rules by a pro-
vision in the security agreement if practicable and possible,'
5. UNIroRm COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-312 [hereinafter references to
sections of the 1958 Official Edition will be made only by section number].
See Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Priorities Among
Secured Creditors and the "Floating Lien," 72 HARv. L REv. 838 (1959);
Hogan, Financing the Acquisition of New Goods Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 3B.C. IND. & COM. L. Rnv. 115 (1962).
6. § 9-204. See Coogan, Operating Under Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code Without Help or Hindrance of the "Floating Lien," 15 Bus.
LAw. 373 (1960).
7. § 9-205. Compare Note, 38 MINN. L. REv. 249 (1954).
8. §§ 9-401-07. See Coogan, Public Notice Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code and Other Recent Chattel Security Laws, Including "Notice
Filing," 47 IowA L. REv. 289 (1962); Haydock, Certainty and Convenience
-Criteria for the Place of Filing Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 3
B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 179 (1962).
9. § 9-504, comment 1. The writings of the draftsmen of the original
Code treatment make this purpose clear. Dunham, Article 9 of the Revised
Uniform Commercial Code, Secured Transactions, 1950 N.J.S.B.A. YEAR-
BOOK 91, 95; Gilmore, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code-Part V.
7 CONF. ON PER. FIN. L.Q. 4,7 (1952).
10. § 9-507, comment 1.
11. § 9-507(2).
12. The general Code rule on variation by agreement is set out in §
1-102(3), (4). The various Code provisions that specifically prohibit varia-
tion are collected in Bunn, Freedom of Contract Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 2 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 59 (1960).
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but a long-standing concern with overreaching by secured creditors
is reflected in the Code limitations upon variation by agreement.
These limitations are collected in section 9-501. Fundamentally,
variations of the rules dealing with accounting for surplus proceeds,
the disposition of the collateral, the retention of the collateral,
redemption, and the liability for noncompliance may not be
varied in advance to the extent that "they give rights to the debtor
and impose duties on the secured party."' 3 Significantly, the Code
does permit the agreement to establish standards for the measure-
ment of the performance of these obligations so long as such
standards are "not manifestly unreasonable."' This ability to set
standards for Code-created obligations will be especially important
in working out a practicable program for default under the gen-
eral Code requirement that dispositions must be "commercially
reasonable."' 5
This Article will first examine the concept of default and then
will study the various means of enforcement by proceedings within
the control of the secured party. After the general Code plan has
been established, certain specialized problems such as those re-
lating to consumer goods, equipment, goods covered by docu-
ments, intangibles, and agreements covering both real and per-
sonal property, will be considered. Finally, the Article will deal
with enforcement by judicial proceedings.
At the outset it should be made clear that the Code pattern
in default proceedings is formulated upon the notion that the
remedies will be the same with respect to all kinds of collateral
and without regard to whether the secured party is in possession."
The departures from this pattern occur only where there is a per-
ceived need for specialized treatment.
13. § 9-501(3).
14. §§ 9-501(3), 1-102(3).
15. § 9-504(3).
16. Although the Code abandons the terminology of the prior law and
concentrates upon the nature of the collateral and function of the security
devices, the pledge remains as a security interest created and perfected by
possession. §§ 9-203(1)(a), -302(1)(a). Distinctions in the Code as to
filing and priority parallel the law of conditional sales and trust receipts
when a purchase money security interest is involved, but in the Code
the purchase money category is not limited as to sellers or goods. § 9-107.
See Hogan, supra note 5. Formalities are simplified, but all agreements
for nonpossessory interests must be in writing to be enforceable against
the debtor or third parties. §§ 9-110, -203; cf. MINN. STAT. § 511.18
(1961). Most of the important distinctions among classes of collateral, such
as inventory, equipment, consumer goods, and accounts, are set forth i-i
§ 9-102, comment. For a "painless" introduction to Article 9, see Coogan.
The Lazy Lawyer's Guide to Secured Transactions Under the Code, 60
MIcH. L. REv. 685 (1962).
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I. DEFAULT
Article 9 of the Code does not often specifically answer the
question of what is a "default under a security agreement."'"
Once such a default occurs, the remedial techniques of Part 5 of
Article 9 are made operative. For the most part, the security agree-
ment itself must define the standards for determining whether a
default occurs. Default may hinge on such things as a failure to
make a required payment; the unauthorized removal of the col-
lateral; the filing of a petition in bankruptcy or the making of an
assignment for the benefit of creditors; the death of an individual
debtor; the dissolution of, or the appointment of a receiver for, a
business debtor; the legal seizure of the collateral; the unauthorized
sale or transfer of the collateral; or the making of any fraudulent
or false statement by the debtor at the time of the credit extension.
Obviously, the draftsman of the particular standard form or tailor-
made arrangement must carefully review these risks when the se-
cured party can be most effectively protected by seizure and dis-
position of the collateral.
A. ACCELERATION CLAUSES AND DEFAULT
In some instances, the Code does provide standards for default
-"acceleration" or "insecurity" clauses are dealt wvith in Article
1." It is often wise to include such an acceleration provision in
the security agreement to assure that the violation of an ancillary
promise will mature the promise to pay the debt. This gives the
secured party an assurance of his ability to bring suit to obtain a
money judgment for the debt and not merely for damages for
violation of the related promise.
Frequently these acceleration clauses turn upon a failure to
make an installment payment when due. At that point all install-
ments ripen and must be paid by the debtor. 9 In addition to this
kind of acceleration, the security agreement may also include the
right to accelerate the entire debt whenever the secured party deems
himself to be insecure. Where the right turns upon the secured
party's state of mind rather than upon an observable fact, there is
a real potential for abuse. The Code basically requires that the
17. § 9-501. See §§ 1-208, 9-206,-311.
18. § 1-208. Such acceleration clauses are also less of a problem on
the question of the formal requisites for negotiability. See § 3-109; Note,
101 U. PA. L. REv. 835 (1953).
19. There may still be a right to redeem the goods on the payment of
the overdue instalment. See text accompanying note 158 infra. There is
some indication that the secured party may have a duty to elect to ac-
celerate notwithstanding the wording of the clause. Note, 88 U. PA. L.
REv. 94, 96 (1939) (real property mortgages).
1962] 209
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creditor be honest.2" Under section 1-208, an accelerating party
has the power to act only if he has the good faith belief that the
prospect of payment or performance is impaired. The debtor who
wishes to object to the acceleration must sustain the burden of
establishing lack of good faith, which is defined as "honesty in
fact."'" Consequently, the secured party is fairly safe in operating
under such an insecurity clause. At the same time, there is available
judicial control of his conduct when there is evidence of dishonesty.
In the absence of an acceleration clause, the creditor could pro-
ceed to enforce the security for the default in a single payment,
but in the ordinary case this would hardly be worth the effort.
Usually the safest route calls for the inclusion of such a clause
and for its enforcement when the debtor breaches either his prom-
ise to pay or any related promise in the security agreement.
B. PROHIBITION ON TRANSFER BY THE DEBTOR AND DEFAULT
The Code also recognizes the debtor's interest in the collateral
and provides that this interest may be reached by creditors or
may be voluntarily transferred by the debtor "notwithstanding a
provision in the security agreement prohibiting any transfer or
making the transfer constitute a default."2 The quoted language
should in no way impede the secured party's right to proceed to
enforce his interest in the collateral after the voluntary or involun-
tary transfer. The only purpose of this reference to default is to
20. Judicial reaction to such clauses has varied. In some cases, the credi-
tor is said to be the sole judge of the facts and is bound only to act in good
faith. E.g., Thorp v. Fleming, 78 Kan. 237, 96 Pac. 470 (1908); Johnson
v. Thayer, 53 Ohio App. 25, 4 N.E.2d 172 (1936); Cline v. Libby, 46
Wis. 123, 49 N.W. 832 (1879). Other courts conclude that the creditor
must be in good faith and have reason to think himself insecure. E.g..
Bullock v. Young, 118 A.2d 917 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1955); Monson
v. Pickett, 253 Minn. 550, 93 N.W.2d 537 (1958); Deal v. D. M. Osborne
& Co., 42 Minn. 102, 43 N.W. 835 (1889); Kellogg v. Anderson, 40 Minn.
207, 41 N.W. 1045 (1889); cf. Hendrickson v. Grengs, 237 Minn. 196. 54
N.W.2d 105 (1952); Parks v. Phillips, 71 Nev. 313, 289 P.2d 1053 (1955);
Woodruff v. Stahl, 126 Wash. 184, 217 Pac. 1013 (1923). Still others
conclude that the creditor must act in good faith and upon facts that
actually make the debt insecure. Flinn v. Fredrickson, 89 Neb. 563, 131
N.W. 934 (1911); Humpfner v. D. M. Osborne & Co., 2 S.D. 310, 50
N.W. 88 (1891). Under § 9-201, regulatory legislation may still affect
these clauses. See Hogan, A Survey of State Retail Instalment Sales Legis-
lation, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 38, 55 (1958).
21. § 1-201(19). Under § 2-103(1)(b) of the Sales Article, "good
faith" in the case of a merchant requires, in addition to honesty in fact,
the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the
trade. It is doubtful that this added duty upon merchants, defined in
2-104, will affect their obligations under Article 1 or Article 9. See §
1-201, comment 19.
22 § 9-311.
210 [Vol. 47:205
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assure that even if the transfer is a default, the transferee obtains
some rights.23 In no sense does the language prevent the secured
party from proceeding to enforce his interest because such a trans-
fer constitutes a default.24 The only impediment to enforcement
by the secured party after this kind of transfer will come from
other Code rules protecting third parties."
II. SELF-HELP: THE RIGHT TO POSSESSION
UPON DEFAULT
A. THE SECURED PARTY'S OBLIGATIONS IN REPOSSESSING
Commonly, with chattel security, the secured party seeks to re-
capture the collateral from the debtor after default without the
aid of judicial process.26 Litigation only adds to the expenses of
the lender seeking to recoup his loss. The Code, as did the prior
Uniform Laws dealing with chattel security, makes clear that the
secured party has the right to take possession upon default with-
out judicial process as long as no breach of the peace results."
Chattel mortgage law, governed for the most part by non-uniform
statutes, was not always so clear, mainly because of some con-
fusion with the law of real property foreclosures.' Again, like the
prior uniform legislation on the subject, the Code makes no attempt
to articulate the standards for determining whether the repossession
can be accomplished without breach of the peace.'
23. § 9-311, comment 2.
24. Oklahoma provides a variation which makes this result clear. The
latest version of the Code proposed in California has the same provision.
Comment, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 812, 976 (1961).
25. In some cases, Article 9 permits third parties to prevail over the
secured creditor even where the security interest is perfected by filing.
See, e.g., §§ 9-307(1) (buyers in ordinary course of business), -310 (liens
arising by operation of law), -309 (protection of purchasers of instruments
and documents).
26. In consumer transactions, the repossession of motor vehicles is more
common than the repossession of household goods. Automobiles are more
easily seized and sold and have a sufficiently active resale market to
permit recovery of the costs of repossession. 1 U.S. BD. oF Gov's, CoN-
STMER INSTALMENT CREDITS, pt. 1, at 75 (1957).
27. § 9-503; see UNIFORM CoNDImONAL SALES ACT § 16; UNIFORM
TRUST RECEIPTS ACT § 6. The Code does not permit the secured creditor
the right to extinguish the debtor's right to redeem by sending a notice
prior to repossession, as do UmIFoam CoNDrIoTNAL SALES ACT §§ 17-18:
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 , § 245 (1961); MINN. STAT. § 511.19 (1961).
On the other hand, the Code does not impose any duty upon the secured
party to delay sale for a specified period. See §§ 9-504-07.
28. See Gilmore & Axelrod, Chattel Security: 1, 57 YALE LJ. 517,
532 (1948); Annot., 36 A.L.R. 853 (1925).
29. § 9-503; see UNIFORM CONDrrIONAL SALES ACT §§ 16-17; UNi-
FORM TRUST RECEIPTS ACT § 6.
1962]
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On occasion, debtors have been able to recover substantial
amounts when they have been successful in asserting tort liability
against the secured party because of the conduct of the reposses-
sion." Where the threat of such liability is present, the wise
course is to proceed by action to recapture the collateral. What
form that action will take must depend upon local law. In Penn-
sylvania, the Code was amended to specify that the secured party
may elect to proceed "by writ of replevin or otherwise."'"
A new feature of the Code provisions is the statutory recognition
of a provision in a security agreement requiring the debtor to as-
semble the collateral and make it available at a reasonably con-
venient place to be designated by the secured party.32 This feature
is not expressly limited to any particular kind of collateral or to
any particular type of transaction. However, it would appear from
the fact that the section relates to taking possession of the col-
lateral that it only deals with tangible kinds of collateral, such as
goods, documents, instruments, and chattel paper.33 Although
30. Arkansas: Manhattan Credit Co. v. Brewer, 232 Ark. 976, 341
S.W.2d 765 (1961) (repossession right denied over purchaser's oral ob-jection-wrongful conversion $200 recovery); Kensinger Acceptance Corp.
v. Davis, 223 Ark. 942, 269 S.W.2d 792 (1954) (conversion and assault-
recovery included $800 punitive damages); California: Schanafelt v. Sea-
board Fin. Co., 108 Cal. App. 2d 420, 239 P.2d 42 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951)(false imprisonment-recovery $2,500, including $2,000 punitive damages);
Georgia: Walker v. Ayers, 47 Ga. App. 113, 169 S.E. 784 (1933) (wrongful
conversion); Illinois: Burris v. Commercial Credit Corp., 15 I11. App. 2d
458, 146 N.E.2d 218 (1957) (wrongful conversion); Kentucky: National
Bond & Inv. Co. v. Whithorn, 276 Ky. 204, 123 S.W.2d 263 (1938) (false
imprisonment-recovery $1,600); C.I.T. Corp. v. Short, 273 Ky. 190, 115
S.W.2d 899 (1938) (wrongful conversion-reversed on element of punitive
damages); Massachusetts: Drake v. Metropolitan Mfg. Co., 218 Mass.
112, 105 N.E. 634 (1914); 223 Mass. 314, 111 N.E. 873 (1916) (assault
and battery-recovery $2,350, although debt was approximately ten dol-
lars); Lambert v. Robinson, 162 Mass. 34, 37 N.E. 753 (1894) (assault
and battery, trespass); Michigan: Zart v. Singer Sewing Mach. Co., 162
Mich. 387, 127 N.W. 272 (1910) (assault); New York: Peddie v. Gaily,
109 App. Div. 178, 95 N.Y. Supp. 652 (1905) (assault and battery-re-
covery $500; debt was balance on a bedstead); O'Connell v. Samuels, 81
Hun 357, 30 N.Y. Supp. 889 (Sup. Ct. 1894) (assault and battery, tres-
pass); Ohio: Kindberg v. C.I.T. Corp., 35 Ohio L. Abs. 523, 41 N.E.2d
1021 (Ct. App. 1940) (assault, wrongful conversion-recovery $2,625);
Oklahoma: Russell-Lock Super-Serv., Inc. v. Vaughn, 170 Okla. 377, 40
P.2d 1090 (1935) (assault and battery-recovery $1,000, although debt
was for one storage battery); Firebaugh v. Gunther, 106 Okla. 131, 233
Pac. 460 (1925) (conversion-recovery $450, although debt was $77);
Oregon: Lamb v. Woodry, 154 Ore. 30, 58 P.2d 1257 (1936) (assault and
*battery-recovery for fright, with punitive damages allowed); Pennsyl-
vania: Abel v. M. H. Pickering Co., 58 Pa. Super. 439 (1914) (assault and
battery).
31. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-503 (Supp. 1961).
32. § 9-503.
33. See note 16 supra.
212 [Vol. 47:205
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Article 9 is silent on the question of the enforcement of this con-
tractual right to require the debtor to assemble the collateral, sec-
tion 1-106 clearly invites a court to grant specific relief. Money
damages in this context are hardly sufficient to put the secured
creditor who already has a money claim "in as good a position
as if the other party had fully performed."34
B. THE SECURED PARTY'S OBLIGATIONS WILE IN PossEssIoN
OF THE COLLATERAL
To the secured party who repossesses, the introductory section
of the default rules gives the rights, remedies, and duties, provided
in section 9-207. The latter section also sets forth the obligation
of a pledgee or the holder of a possessory security interest. A
high degree of freedom is given to the secured party during the
period he is in possession since only two of the rules in section
9-207 cannot be altered by agreement of the parties. 5 First,
the obligation to use reasonable care in the custody and preserva-
tion of collateral in the secured party's possession cannot be
disclaimed, but the security agreement may set up standards
that are not "manifestly unreasonable."3 " Despite this general
prohibition upon disclaimer of the obligation to use reasonable
care, the section clearly authorizes disclaimer in connection with
the obligation to preserve rights against prior parties on instru-
ments or chattel paper.3 Second, the secured party may not rely
on a contractual provision authorizing him to use or operate con-
sumer goods. All other kinds of collateral may be used or operated
(1) in the manner and to the extent provided in the underlying
agreement; (2) for the purpose of preserving the collateral or
its value; or (3) pursuant to the order of a court of appropriate
jurisdiction.38 Consumer goods are expressly excepted only from
the first mentioned category. The freedom to use or operate the
collateral is important in business financings since the secured
party who repossesses may thus preserve the going-concern value
of the debtor's enterprise. Obviously, this has particular impact
on trust indentures. In fact, the present Code rules in this context
are the product of objections to the possible limitations imposed
by earlier forms of the Code.39
34. § 1-106(1).
35. § 9-501(3) will still prohibit any agreement waiving or varying the
protected class of rights of the debtor and the mandatory duties of the
secured party. § 9-207, comment 4.
36. § 9-501(3).
37. § 9-207(1).
38. § 9-207(4).
39. Draftsmen of corporate indentures were concerned that the earlier
19621
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The wise approach for the counselor calls for a step-by-step
analysis of the other specific rules of section 9-207, which will
control "unless otherwise agreed."
Risk of Loss and Increase. To the extent of any deficiency in
effective insurance coverage, the risk of accidental loss or damage
to collateral in the possession of the secured party remains on the
debtor. Making insurance relevant here is consistent with the risk
rules in Article 2, which govern the time at which risk passes to
any purchaser at a disposition.4" Any non-monetary increase in
the collateral may be held by the secured party as additional se-
curity. 1 Money, such as interest, must be applied in reduction
of the obligation or remitted to the debtor.42 The latter course
is hardly appropriate in the default situation.
Commingling the Collateral. The secured party must keep the
collateral "identifiable," but fungible collateral may be com-
mingled.43 The definition of fungible includes certain securities
and goods, but recognizes that the parties may make goods fung-
ible by contract.44 In New York's Article 8, a special modification
makes all investment securities fungible. 5
Repledge. The debtor's right to redeem must not be impaired
version of § 9-501 might exclude a common provision that upon default
the trustee could enter the debtor's premises and "collect and receive all
rents, tolls, issues, income and proceeds therefrom," or seek a receiver
to make such collections. The amendments to §H 9-501 and 9-207 were
made in the 1958 Supplement to the 1957 Text edition of the Code. Coogan
& Bok, The Impact of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code on the
Corporate Indenture, 69 YALE L.J. 203, 221 n.61 (1959).
40. By § 9-504(1), all of the provisions of Article 2 govern any sale
of goods by a secured creditor after default. Sections 2-509 and 2-510 put
the risk on the possessor rather than the owner of the goods in situations
where there is a likelihood of insurance. Section 2-722 may permit the
secured party seller to recover from third parties who negligently injure
the goods prior to default. See Harvard Trust Co. v. Racheotes, 337 Mass.
73, 147 N.E.2d 817 (1958), 38 B.U.L. REV. 620 (1958); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 231, § 85E (Supp. 1961).
41. § 9-207(2)(c). But see RESTATEMENT, SECURITY § 3 (1941).
42. § 9-207(2) (c). The pledgee's right to dividends declared on shares
registered in the name of the pledgor is limited by § 8-207. See Notc.
45 CORNELL L.Q. 111, 116 (1959).
43. § 9-207(2)(d).
44. § 1-201(17). The notion of fungible goods under the pre-Code law
seemed to require that each unit must, by its nature or by mercantile usage,
be the equivalent of another. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 76(1). Distinguished
commentators on the Sales Act have suggested that the test is basically
whether the parties intended to treat the mass as fungible. VOLD, SALES
230 (2d ed. 1959); 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 159 (rev. ed. 1948).
45. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 553, § 8-105 (effective September 27,
1964). On the New York variations, see Penney, New York Revisits the
Code: Some Variations in the New York Enactment of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 992 (1962).
[Vol. 47:205214
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by a repledge of the collateral,46 but usually the secured party
will not consider using the authorization to repledge. In some situa-
tions such action may be perfectly proper, as where there is an
attempt to avoid the drastic remedy of liquidation through the
operation of the business by the secured party."7 One caution
must be raised in connection with this requirement. The redemption
section of the Code specifies that any other secured party is also
entitled to redeem.4 Consequently, if repledge is contemplated,
the realizing secured party would be well advised to preserve
the redemption rights of the debtor and any other secured party.
Il. CODE TOOLS FOR REALIZATION
A. RETENTION OF THE COLLATERAL IN SATISFACTION OF THE
OBLIGATION
With an important exception relating to certain consumer trans-
actions, 9 the Code permits the secured party after default to
propose to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation
of the debtor.5" The policy permitting this non-judicial type of
benevolent strict foreclosure is based upon the conclusion that
experience has shown that parties are frequently better off without
a resale of the collateral.51 If the debtor or certain other secured
parties object to the retention within specified periods, the secured
46. § 9-207(2)(e). If the collateral is a negotiable document or in-
strument, the repledge may constitute an effective transfer even though
wrongful as to the debtor. See RESTATEMENT, SECURrrY §§ 23, 41 (1941).
47.
Creditors' agreements are used when the creditors are in substantial
accord and regard the debtor's embarrassment as temporary, due to
unfavorable market conditions, a low phase of the business cycle,
unfortunate financial policies, or inefficient marketing methods ....
The creditors will be inclined to work out some friendly method of
continuing the business in order to realize their obligations when
there is a pronounced difference between the value of a business
as a going concern and the forced-sale value of individual assets.
Bank creditors especially may be concerned to have the raw ma-
terials in the creditor's stock converted into finished products. Mer-
chandise creditors may find in the debtor one of their chief outlets.
HANNA & MACLACHLAN, CASES ON CREDITORS' RIGHTS AND CORPORATE
REORGANiZATION 27 (cohsol. 5th ed. 1957).
48. § 9-506.
49. This exception is discussed in text accompanying note 171 infra.
50. § 9-505(2). In a limited sense, this Code rule is similar to the com-
mon-law rules governing conditional sales, which permitted the seller
to elect to retain "title" to the goods or to sue for the price and pass "title"
to the buyer. See Warren, supra note 1, at 290.
51. § 9-505, comment 1. From the debtor's viewpoint, it must be kept
in mind that a retention of the collateral permits the secured party to keep
the goods and any payments made by the debtor.
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party must dispose of the collateral.52 Otherwise, the collateral
may be retained by the secured party, and the debtor is discharged
of all liability for a deficiency.3
Two classes of third parties must be considered in connection
with the proposal for retention of the collateral.
The debtor is entitled to a written notice of the proposed
retention from the secured party in possession.' Within thirty
days of the receipt of that notice, the dissenting debtor must object
in writing to the retention. This means that in some cases the
secured party may be required to store the collateral for as many
as thirty days.55 Although the thirty-day period begins to run
upon receipt of the notice, the Code does not clearly provide for
the termination of the period by written objection. Unfortunately,
the Code is silent as to whether the dispatch or the receipt of the
written objection by the debtor is the crucial point.5 Another poten-
tial problem for the secured party may stem from the vacillating
debtor who objects in writing to the retention, withdraws the
objection, and then objects again, all within the thirty-day period.
The Code, indicates from the expression of the rule, that the last
objection may be effective despite the possibility of an estoppel. 7
52. § 9-505(2). Under the UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT §§ 19-
20, the buyer is required to notify the seller of his demand for a resale
in cases where a compulsory resale was not required. The Code rule will
preclude the loss of the right to a resale by the debtor's ignorance of his
right to make a demand. In Minnesota, no compulsory resale is required,
but the debtor has thirty days in which to redeem when he has paid fifty
per cent or more on the purchase price of a conditionally sold motor
vehicle. MINN. STAT. § 511.195 (1961).
53. § 9-505(2).
54. The statute requires that the secured party must be in possession
prior to sending the notice. § 9-505(2). Furthermore, if the secured party
knows that the collateral is owned by a person who is not the debtor, the
actual owner is entitled to notice of, and to object to, any retention. § 9-
112(b).
55. It has been suggested by an experienced commentator that this
thirty-day period is unrealistic and will result in secured parties ignoring
the retention tool in favor of an immediate resale, and that as a conse-
quence, debtors will be called upon to pay deficiencies more frequently.
KRIPKE, PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, PROGRAM ON UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE (1962).
56. If the secured party is confronted by a written objection dispatched
before the thirty-day period but received after that period, the wise counsel-
ing point may be to dispose of the collateral. There is, however, much
merit to the argument that the thirty-day period is more than Renerous,
and that the adoption of an interpretation making the dispatch of the
written objection the effective point actually extends the thirty-day veriod.
Obviously, if the dispatch is crucial, then the secured party must wait for
the thirty days and for the expiration of a period thereafter sufficient to
allow for the delivery of the notice of objection mailed on the last day
of the thirty-day period.
57. "If the debtor . . . obiects in writing within thirtv days . . . the se-
cured party must dispose of the collateral. . . ." § 9-505(2).
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The best counseling technique here seems to be to proceed to
dispose of the collateral promptly after the first objection. No right
to retention and freedom from liability for deficiency would be
won by the debtor in that event, and the debtor who first rejected
the proffered retention could not properly claim any right to rely
on the very proposal he first spurned.8 '
Other secured parties who are known to the person proposing
retention or who have filed a financing statement in the state are
also entitled to notice of the proposed retention. 9 As will be
seen in connection with the application of the proceeds upon dis-
position of the collateral, the Code explicitly recognizes the rights
of junior secured parties. 0 In the present context, subordinate
secured creditors may have a greater interest than the debtor in
assuring that a disposition in the form of a sale of the collateral
takes place. The fact that the junior security interest may absorb
all of the debtor's "equity" may be the very reason why the debtor
does not care whether the disposition takes place.
Of course, in providing a rule that protects the junior secured
creditor, the Code is also imposing a burden upon the secured
party who is seeking to realize his claim. When he decides to
propose to retain the collateral, the secured creditor must search
the records for those persons who have duly filed financing
statements indexed in the name of the debtor in "this State."'
To ease this burden somewhat, no such duty is placed on the
secured party in consumer goods transactions. 2 Thus, the princi-
pal impact of the rule will be in business and farm transactions.
If the Code's central filing rules for business deals are adopted,
a single search of the central office will be sufficient to meet the
requirement.63 In the farm transaction, the filings will also be
concentrated in either a single local office, or in the central office
where a state adopts central filing in all cases." Where fixtures
are involved, it will also be necessary to search the financing state-
58. Under § 9-505(1), it could be argued that the debtor in these cir-
cumstances hag-signed "after default a statement renouncing or modifying
his rights under this Part. . . ." Whether this language also controls in
subsection (2) seems to be an open question. See note 154 infra.
59. § 9-505(2).
60. § 9-504(1) (c). See text accompanying note 153 infra.
61. § 9-505(2).
62. Ibid. In Oklahoma the exception as to consumer goods was retained
in the retention section, but omitted in the disposition section. OKLA. STAT.
tit. 12A, §§ 9-504(3), -505(2) (1961).
63. § 9-401, optional para. (c). With or without the bracketed phrase
calling for double filing where there is a place of business in only one
county, this section still requires central filing. For variation in the filing
rules, see Haydeck, supra note 8.
64. Under § 9-401, optional paragraph (a) may make farm trans-
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ments filed with the real property records.6" The burden on the
creditor is also eased by reason of the fact that only secured
parties who are known or who have financing statements filed
in "this State" are entitled to notice.6" No duty to search the
records elsewhere is practicable, and the obligation is fulfilled by
searching the records in the state where the property is located. 7
In addition to deciding when written objection to the disposition
must be received, the secured party realizing on the collateral must
concern himself with fixing the time when he must determine the
class of secured creditors entitled to notice. If a secured party has
or takes possession of the collateral and decides to offer to retain
the, collateral in satisfaction of the indebtedness, he must send
notices to other known secured parties and to those who have
duly filed a financing statement in the appropriate state." When
are these classes determined? If the secured party proposing re-
tention learns of another security interest, or another financing
statement is filed after he has dispatched the written proposal,
must additional notices be sent? The Code gives no explicit answer
to this question. In other comparable areas, the Code adopts a
sensible rule of practicality and does not require a series of no-
tices.69 The provision here should be read in the same pragmatic
light; the group entitled to notice should be limited to those known
or on file at the time the notice-proposing retention is dispatched.
The class of secured parties entitled to notice is narrower than
that entitled to object to the retention. If secured parties not en-
actions the subject of local filing or optional paragraph (c) may require
all filings (save fixtures) to be filed centrally.
65. § 9-401(b).
66. § 9-505(2).
67. The limited search in the state where the property is located and
the exception as to consumer goods were inserted in the Code after the
New York Law Revision had criticized the broader rule. ALI, 1956 REc-
OMMENDATIONS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE 311-12.
The choice of law rules of § 9-103 relate only to the "validity and per-
fection of the security interest" and do not expressly deal with realization
upon default. If not within the notion of "validity," realization proceedings
will be governed by the general Code rules on choice of law in § 1-105,
which will make the Code apply to transactions "bearing an appropriate
relation to this state." The possible complexities of this approach are in-
dicated in Cavers, The Conditional Seller's Remedies and The Choice-
of-Law Process-Some Notes on Shanahan, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1126,
1142-47 (1960).
68. § 9-505(2).
69. Under the Bulk Transfers Article, creditors who become such after
the notice to creditors is dispatched are not entitled to notice. § 6-109.
The notices required of a purchase money inventory financer under
9-312(3) must be sent to other secured creditors who are known to the
financer or who have filed at the time the purchase money man fi,,
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titled to notice of the proposed retention learn of the proposal,
they are also entitled to insist on disposition of the collateral."
No burden is cast upon the secured creditor seeking to satisfy his
claim by reason of this rule. In these cases the thirty-day period
for objection obviously cannot run from the receipt of notice, and
the Code sets the thirty-day period running at the time the secured
party obtains possession.71 Where a non-possessory security in-
terest is present, the time will start when the secured party takes
possession under section 9-503, and there is little difficulty with
the test. However, when a pledge-type, possessory security interest
is involved, the statute literally starts the period at the time the
pledgee takes possession and perfects his security interest.' This
act occurs long before default, and the Code rule consequently
literally deprives other secured creditors who are not entitled to
notice of any right to object to a proposed retention of the col-
lateral: In this limited category, this result is patently unfair and
should be changed.
B. DISPOSITION BY SALE OR OTHERWISE
Where retention of the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation
is rejected by either the statute, the secured party, or those en-
titled to object, the secured creditor must proceed in accordance
with the core of Part 5 of the Code, section 9-504. The policy
of Article 9 is to provide a simple, efficient, and flexible tool to
produce the maximum amount from the disposition of the col-
lateral.73 To effectuate that decision, the Code draftsmen rejected
any requirement of a mandatory public sale on the assumption"
that private sales through regular commercial channels will normal-
ly produce more money.74 As a necessary partner to that con-
clusion, the draftsmen also discarded any elaborate public notice
requirements of the time and place of the sale. In addition, there
is no set waiting period for disposing of the collateral after de-
fault.7
All of these apparent blessings to the secured creditor must
be considered in light of the specific requirement of section 9-504
70. § 9-505(2).
71. Ibid.
72. "[lIf any other secured party objects in writing within thirty days
after the secured party obtains possession the secured party must dispose of
the collateral under Section 9-504." § 9-505(2).
73. See Gilmore, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code-Part V:
Default, 7 CoNI. ON PmR. FIN. L.Q., 4,9 (1952).
74. § 9-504, comment 1.
75. Nonetheless, the disposition must be commercially reasonable, and
if the secured party attempts to make a public sale he may be required
to give some kind of public notice. See text following note 101 infra.
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that the disposition must be "commercially reasonable" in "every
aspect including the method, manner, time, place and terms ... "
This section attempts to chart a path in the narrow area between
two policy positions--one, a desire to impede dishonest dispositions,
and the other, a reluctance to strangle honest transactions with
red tape."6 As will be seen shortly, not all of the legal red tape
has disappeared.
1. Code Requirements in Making the Disposition: Commercial
Reasonableness
(a) Tests of Commercial Reasonableness: "Recognized Mar-
ket"
In pursuit of its goal of flexibility, the Code substitutes for the
more specific and rigid tests of the prior law a requirement that
every aspect of a disposition, including the method, manner, time,
place, and terms, must be "commercially reasonable."77 This gen-
eral standard is a favorite in the Code, and case law will undoubt-
edly develop some precise criteria for its application." In the
meantime, the secured party must work out a practicable set of
standards for himself in light of the various Code rules and the
prior case law. For Article 9, the comments state that it is of great
importance to make clear what types of disposition are to be con-
sidered "commercially reasonable," particularly in light of the
serious consequences attached to a violation of that standard."9
Section 9-507(2) is the Code's attempt to set forth tests for
making the kind of prediction envisioned by that comment.
In cases covered by the last sentence of section 9-507(2), this
goal of a clear standard is met. Any disposition, by sale or other-
wise, is conclusively deemed to be commercially reasonable where
approved in any judicial proceeding, by any bona fide creditors'
committee, or by a representative of creditors. Troublesome ques-
76. Gilmore, supra note 73, at 7.
77. § 9-504(3).
78. For example, the Code expressly makes "commercial reasonableness"
a standard of conduct in defining the merchant's duty of good faith (§
2-103); in limiting one party's right to specify the particulars of perfor-
mance (§ 2-311); in limiting the seller's resale (§ 2-706); in authorizing
a buyer to recover incidental damages (§ 2-715); in the enforcement of
a warehouseman's or carrier's lien (§§ 7-210, -308); and in the duty
of good faith of a bailee who delivers according to the terms of a docu-
ment (§ 7-404). In an earlier version of Article 3, the holder in due course
definition also contained the same standard. After much debate, particu-
larly in New York, the provision was dropped. Braucher, Legislative His-
tory of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 798, 812
(1958). Nonetheless, the problem continued to plague the Code sponsors.
Penney, supra note 45, at 998.
79. § 9-507(1), comment.
220 [Vol. 47:205
DEFAULT PROCEEDINGS
tions here will probably be rare. Of course, any collusively ob-
tained approvals could still be attacked as violations of the se-
cured party's general obligation of good faith,"0 and there may
be some argument over the definition of "bona fide creditors'
committee '81 and "representative of creditors. ' Otherwise the
provision can be safely relied upon by a realizing secured creditor.
The second sentence of section 9-507(2) is not so free from
difficult questions in determining the kinds of disposition that are
to be considered commercially reasonable. Three categories of
sales are isolated here: (1) those in a recognized market; (2)
those at a price current in such a market; and (3) those in con-
formity with commercial practices among dealers.' All are deemed
sales made in a commercially reasonable manner. Since the "man-
ner" seems to be a distinct aspect of a disposition, this special
provision may be only partially effective. Sales xvithin these classes
may still be attacked as violating the standard of commercial
reasonableness as to other aspects of the sale, including method,
time, and place."s This conclusion finds support in the language
of section 9-507(2) itself. Certainly the draftsmen expressed
their policy plainly by making all sales approved in judicial pro-
ceedings or by appropriate representatives of creditors commercially
reasonable as a matter of law." On the other hand, sales in a
80. § 1-203. Good faith is defined in § 1-201(19) as "honesty in
fact." This test apparently is wholly subjective since comment 19 to §
1-201 indicates that the commercial reasonableness tests of §§ 2-103
and 7-404 add to the duty of good faith.
81. The question of a "bona fide" committee suggests the possibility
that something different from the common Code term of "good faith" as
defined in § 1-201(19) is required.
82. In § 9-507, comment 1, there is a reference to the definition of
"representative" in § 1-201(35) in connection with the approval of a dis-
position by a representative of creditors. The Article I definition is not
so helpful as § 9-301(3), which spells out the meaning of "lien creditor"
as including a trustee in bankruptcy or an assignee for the benefit of
creditors. See also § 1-201(12) for the statutory definition of "creditor."
83.
If the secured party either sells the collateral in the usual manner
in any recognized market therefor or if he sells at the price current
in such market at the time of his sale or if he has otherwise sold in con-
formity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the
type of property sold he has sold in a commercially reasonable man-
ner.§ 9-507(2).
84. § 9-504(3). A failure to appreciate this point led to an addition
to the second sentence of § 9-507(2) in Massachusetts and New Hamp-
shire, requiring the secured party to act for the "purposes of avoidinq.
or reducing loss and of effective realization." MASS. GEN. LAws ANN.
ch. 106, § 9-507(2) (Supp. 1958); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 382A: 9-507
(2) (1961).
85. The provision dealing with representatives of creditors states flatly
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recognized market, or at a price current in that market, and sales
in conformity with dealers' practices were made commercially
reasonable only as to manner.86 It seems only sensible to conclude
that in the Code plan a different result in the two classes of dis-
position is intended.
Some further ambiguity stems from the statement of the classes
of sales made commercially reasonable as to manner. The first
group consists of sales "in the usual manner in any recognized
market.""7 Next, if the manner of the sale differs from the usual,
but the price is the price current in the recognized market, the
sale falls into the second group." In both these categories we
confront the problem of analyzing and defining the term "rec-
ognized market." The scale of possible meanings for this term
is obviously broad, and the use of the word "recognized" im-
mediately provokes questions. Who must recognize the market?
What features must be recognized? Since three fairly liberal privi-
leges are granted to the secured party who sells in a "recognized
market," 9 it is submitted that the courts may read the term
narrowly.
Some tests for the meaning of the term may be found from
the different statutory partners of "recognized market" found in
various Code sections giving the secured party these privileges.
(1) When collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily
in value, notice is excused under section 9-504(3). (2) When
collateral is of a type that is subject to widely distributed standard
price quotations, the secured party may buy at a private dis-
position under section 9-504(3). (3) When a sale is in con-
formity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in
the type of property sold, it is commercially reasonable as to man-
ner under section 9-507(2). One can thus make the inference
that any one of these three features is not sufficient alone to con-
stitute a recognized market.9" Otherwise, their addition to recog-
that the approved disposition "shall conclusively be deemed to be com-
mercially reasonable." § 9-507 (2).
86. Compare § 2-706, dealing with the seller's right to resell upon
breach by the buyer, which requires that where the resale is made in good
faith and in every aspect is commercially reasonable, the seller may re-
cover a deficiency. The relationship of § 2-706 to § 9-507(2) is not stated
in the Code, but the things made commercially reasonable as to manner
in Article 9 will probably be sufficient under Article 2. The same question
may occur in §§ 7-210 and 7-308 dealing with carrier's and warehoiwr-
man's liens.
87. § 9-507(2).
88. Ibid.
89. Notice of a disposition is excused (§ 9-504(3)); the secured party
may buy at a private disposition (§ 9-504(3)); and a resale is considered
to be made in a commercially reasonable manner (§ 9-507(2)).
90. The statement in the text that "recognized market" should be in-
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nized market in the statute would be a meaningless redundancy.
There is clearly no need for alternative categories if "recognized
market" itself includes the alternatives. One must constantly keep
in mind that a disposition is not defective when it is not made
on a recognized market-only those privileges that the Code at-
taches to such a disposition are eliminated.
When the collateral is sold in a market where buy and sell
prices of actual sales of comparable property are quoted and
available to the trade,9 it seems proper to classify that market
as "recognized." Most investment securities and many commodities
would fall into this category.93 More difficulty comes when we
deal with other kinds of collateral, and the final answer must
depend upon the customs of a particular trade. The minimum
standard for a recognized market seems to be that those trading
in this kind of collateral would know and accept the price and
terms generated by a series of purchases of comparable property.
The fact that the particular market, such as an automobile whole-
sale auction, is accepted as a place for disposition of repossessed
cars is probably not enough. However, such auctions are recognized
by dealers as a means of disposing of their own inventory of used
cars and thus may constitute a recognized market for disposing
of automobiles repossessed from a dealer's inventory. For cars
repossessed because of a default by a retail buyer, dealer auctions
probably should not qualify as recognized markets. Since the class
of buyers at such auctions is usually limited to dealers and the
wholesale realization price would not fairly relate to a retail debt,
there is not the assurance of fairness necessary to conclude as a
terpreted in the same fashion whenever it appears in Part 5 of Article
9 is made with the full realization that courts may give the term different
meanings in each section depending upon the nature of the problem. One
can only hope that a statute designed as a coordinated attack upon the
problems of the commercial law will be read more precisely. 'The Code
has probably gone further than any legislation has ever gone in the care
with which it defines and describes terminology used." Malcolm, The Uni-
form Commercial Code As Enacted in Massachusetts, 13 Bus. LAv. 490,
495 (1958).
91. § 2-724 provides that "whenever the prevailing price or value of
any goods regularly bought and sold in any established commodity market
is in issue, reports in official publications or trade journals or in newspapers
or periodicals of general circulation published as the reports of such mar-
ket shall be admissible in evidence." Although not directly relevant to
Article 9, this section may help to qualify the kinds of markets described
as "recognized markets" under Article 9.
92. One of the tests in the definition of "security" under the investment
securities provision of the Code is that the instrument must be of "a tvoe
commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges or markets . . ." § 8-102(1)
(a) (it). This may also help to establish such exchanges as "recognized mar-
kets." Note that an "instrument" under Article 9 includes a security under
Article 8. § 9-105(1) (g).
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matter of law that the sale is made in a commercially reasonablc
manner. A financing agency that has a right of recourse against
the dealer who sold the collateral might be required to call upon
that dealer to make a retail sale of the collateral. Of course, this
does not mean that in a given set of circumstances the use of such
auctions is not commercially reasonable, as where a retail resale
is not feasible. Once again, denying that this kind of sale is made
in a recognized market only precludes the conclusion that the
sale is made in such a way that other Code safeguards need not
be applied. 3 Where dealers in the collateral use association price
lists in the sale of the collateral, these lists should be relevant
in factually ascertaining the reasonableness of the sale, but it is
doubtful that they should control to the extent that a sale made
at a listed price is a sale at the price current in a recognized market
at the time of the sale and thus in a commercially reasonable
manner. Two Pennsylvania lower court opinions now suggest this
result under the Code."'
The first sentence of section 9-507(2) demonstrates that the
Code does not purport to provide a sure guide for testing whether
a sale is "commercially reasonable." Only a negative rule is stated.
The fact that a better price could have been obtained by a sale
at a different time or method is not of itself sufficient to establish
that the sale was not made in a commercially reasonable manner.
The Code here seems to aim at settling a bothersome question
present in various security and execution sales." Little more will
be achieved, since the fact that a better price could be obtained
by a different method or at a different time, when added to other
appropriate evidence, will support a determination that the sale
was not commercially reasonable.
93. See note 89 supra.
94. In Alliance Discount Corp. v. Shaw, 195 Pa. Super. 601, 171 A.2d
548 (1961), the court said that there is no recognized market for used
cars and that "redbook" prices were merely for the dealers' convenience,
and therefore, notice was not excused under § 9-504(3). On the other
hand, in Family Fin. Corp. v. Scott, 24 Pa. D. & C.2d 587 (C.P. 1961),
the court used the "redbook" price to show a wide discrepancy between
the sale price and one recognized value in the trade. In non-Code cases.
the National Tractor and Farm Implement Bluebook, disclosing average
prices of used equipment in poor as well as good condition, has been
held admissible, but not determinative of the fair cash market value. Dear-
born Motors Credit Corp. v. Hinton, 221 Miss. 643, 74 So. 2d 739 (1954).
The National Automobile Dealers Association Book has been made ad-
missible without much discussion in O'Brien v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp., 362 P.2d 455 (Wyo. 1961).
95. In Family Fin. Corp. v. Scott, 24 Pa. D. & C.2d 587 (C.P. 1961),
a resale price of less than fifty per cent of the "redbook" quotation was
held to be sufficient basis to open a deficiency judgment obtained by con-
fession.
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The comments to section 9-507 indicate that none of the
specific methods set forth in subsection two are to be regarded
as either required or exclusive, provided that any disposition is
commercially reasonable. The statute itself only states this con-
clusion in connection with sales approved in judicial proceedings,
by a bona fide creditors' committee, or by a representative of
creditors. Nonetheless, the conclusion in the comment seems war-
ranted. First, the other methods of disposition are not explicitly
made mandatory. Second, a contrary result would reject the policy
that flexible methods of disposition will promote more proceeds
for all concerned.96
What is commercially reasonable in a given disposition pro-
ceeding will normally be a question of fact. If the statute spelled
out further and more specific tests, the Code would freeze practice
at the current level. By keeping the concept open at its boundaries,
the Code sensibly permits change in existing methods and helps
to safeguard the debtor from the practically unlimited ingenuity
of those few secured parties who would consciously evade particu-
larized standards. On the other hand, by providing some fairly
clear standards in certain situations, it permits the secured party
a defense to unfair "strike suits" by a consciously-avaricious
debtor.97
(b) Form of the Disposition: Public or Private, Sale or Lease
The Code quite clearly specifies that the disposition of the
collateral may be by public or private sale, by lease, or by some
other means. Whichever of these forms is employed, the general re-
quirement of commercial reasonableness still controls." If the se-
curity agreement itself originally took the form of a lease of equip-
ment, it might be commercially reasonable to select that same
method when seeking to realize upon the collateral." On the other
hand, the lease of a consumer's automobile might not be com-
mercially reasonable. Although there is an argument to the con-
trary, it seems possible that even the question of public or private
disposition must be examined in terms of commercial reasonable-
96. Note 73 supra.
97. A distinguished scholar has aptly suggested that "the Code obvious-
ly cannot settle in advance questions of fact as to what in particular cir-
cumstances are reasonable methods of disposition of collateral." Hanna,
The Uniform Commercial Code and Mississippi Law of Personal Prop-
erty Security, 31 Miss. LJ. 123, 140 (1960). See Comment, 39 MRQ.
L. REv. 246, 260 (1956).
98. § 9-504(3).
99. A lease may be a security interest within the definition of § 1-201(37) and becomes subject to all of the requirements and protections of
Article 9.
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ness. The language of the first sentence of subsection three of sec-
tion 9-504 states that the proceedings may be public or private,
but then it is indicated in the second sentence that every aspect of
the proceedings must be commercially reasonable, including meth-
od, manner, time, and place. This structuring of the statute
permits two arguments. It can be said that the problem of public
versus private proceedings is settled in the first sentence, and
only other aspects of the disposition are dealt with thereafter when
the commercially reasonable test is imposed. On the other hand,
there is more force to the argument that the Code explicitly re-
quires that the method or manner of the disposition must be
commercially reasonable, and the question of private or public
proceedings is plainly a question of method and manner.'
Whether the sale is public may also involve a question of time
and place. Since the Code fails to define public sale, we are forced
to the prior law to ascertain the standards for such a disposition.
There is some indication that "public" is a literal requirement
and that everyone must be allowed to be present and to make an
offer.' Consequently, the time of the sale must be set after a
due notice to assure such attendance. 2 Perhaps such notice
100. The original Code draftsmen seem to agree that the Code abolished
any requirement of a public sale, but this conclusion under the statute
as now written is not so clear to this writer. Similarly, the suggestion has
been made that a public sale is always a permissible alternative under the
Code. See Gilmore, supra note 73, at 7, 10 (point 6). Yet it seems that
the test of "commercially reasonable" could well be applied to require
a private sale in some circumstances.
101. An annotation on the broad question of what constitutes a "public
sale" within various statutes or in pledge and mortgage agreements con-
cludes that in general the term means "a sale in which the public, upon
proper notice, is invited to participate and give full opportunity to bid upon
a competitive basis for the property placed on sale, which is sold to the
highest bidder." Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 575 (1949). See also Hagan v. Con-
tinental Nat'l Bank, 182 Mo. 319, 342, 81 S.W. 171, 177 (1904) (place
of sale cannot be restricted to particular merchant exchange member-
ship); General Phoenix Corp. v. Cabot, 300 N.Y. 87, 89 N.E.2d 238 (1949)
(place where such sales are usually held is adequate). In Bulldog Concrete
Forms Sales Corp. v. Taylor, 195 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1952), the court
concluded that notice and accessibility to the sale, rather than the place,
was crucial and upheld as a public sale a transaction conducted in a law-
yer's office but open to all who came after notice.
102. Union & Mercantile Trust Co. v. Harnwell, 158 Ark. 295, 250
S.W. 321 (1923), involved an agreement that pledgee could sell a note
"at public or private sale, at any place in the City of Little Rock, without
notice." The court concluded that if pledgee elects to make a public sale,
notice to the public is still necessary. In Louisville Trust Co. v. Drewry,
266 Ky. 279, 98 S.W.2d 900 (1936), the court held that the public must
be afforded notice of the sale and an opportunity to bid in "public sale"
under a pledge agreement. See also In the Matter of Kiamie, 309 N.Y.
325, 130 N.E.2d 745 (1955), where a notice describing only the number
of shares in an otherwise unidentified and unlisted corporation was held
insufficient to satisfy the pledgee's duty of good faith.
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must be published in a newspaper or at some public place.103
Furthermore, the term "public sale" may carry with it the notion
of an auction where the price is successively raised through a
series of offers; thus, sealed bids may not suffice."'H In light of
the fact that the Code does not explicitly require a public sale,
the absence of a definition of the term may not be serious; how-
ever, as was noted earlier, it is possible that the commercial rea-
sonableness standard will require such a sale in some cases."0
The secured party in good faith may erroneously believe that he
is holding a "public sale" when he is, in fact, holding a private
sale. If the secured creditor fails to send a proper notice or pur-
chases at the sale himself, he may incur a substantial liability.'
The articulation of a statutory test of public sale either in the
Code itself or in the accompanying revision of the statutes of
any enacting state seems to be worthwhile to avoid this kind of
unnecessary snare."0 7
103. Finley v. Insurance Fin. Corp., 106 Pa. Super. 314, 163 Ad.
325 (1932) (public sale by pledgee requires some public notice by hand-
bills, newspaper advertisements, or otherwise). Notice directed only to
those whom the pledgee deemed likely to be interested was not sufficient
in Hellman v. Pogue, 22 Ohio C.C. Dec. 559, affd mem., 85 Ohio St.
463, 98 N.E. 1131 (1911).
104. The concept of "public sale" may be equated with "public auction"
so that there may be a requirement that the prospective purchasers must
know of other bids and be permitted to raise their bids. Offredi v. Huhla,
135 Conn. 20, 60 A.2d 779 (1948) (statute authorizing probate court to
order a "public sale" of decedent's realty precludes sealed bid sale). But cf.
Goodman v. Fisher, 205 Misc. 896, 131 N.Y.S.2d 184 (Sup. Ct. 1954)
("public sale" permits sealed bids or auction of land by welfare commis-
sioner). There is some evidence that sale and auction were equated by
the draftsmen of the Code. In discussing § 9-504(3) in an earlier version,
Professor Gilmore stated, "Private sale is never mandatory, however; the
traditional public sale by auction is always a permissible alternative."
Gilmore, supra note 73, at 10 (point 6). (Emphasis added.) The Restate-
ment of Security states that a public sale by a pledgee is
one to which the public is invited by advertisement to appear and bid
at auction for the goods to be sold. The goods must be offered and sold
for cash to the highest responsible bidder. Statutes generally regulate
public sales as to place, notice and conduct. It is usual to provide
that if the sale is not conducted by one of the parties or by a public
official such as a sheriff, it must be in charge of a licensed auctioneer.
A sale of securities or commodities on a stock or commodities ex-
change is now generally regarded as a public sale.
RESTATEMENT, SEcuRrrY § 48(a), comment c (1941).
105. See text accompanying note 100 supra.
106. § 9-507(1).
107. The difficulty is also present to a somewhat lesser degree in other
articles of the Code, where different consequences are attached to a put'lic
and to a private resale by sellers or the holders of certain possessory liens.
Under § 2-706, dealing only with goods, a public sale cannot involve
future goods except where there is a recognized market for futures; it
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(c) Sale in Units or Parcels
Subject to the over-all requirement that every aspect of dis-
position must be commercially reasonable, the secured party is
permitted to dispose of the collateral by one or more contracts,
as a unit, or in parcels.""8 Where disposition of the collateral
as a unit would obviously bring a better price, commercial rea-
sonableness probably dictates a sale as a unit. For example, a
pledgee of shares of corporate stock that represent control of the
corporation probably would be required to obtain the premium
must be conducted at the "usual place or market for public sale," and the
goods must be within view of those attending the sale or made available
for reasonable inspection by prospective bidders. In dealing with the en-
forcement of a warehouseman's lien, § 7-210(2) states rules for delivering
notice, for the location of the sale, and for public notices, by newspaper or
posting, where the goods were stored by someone who is not a merchant
acting in the course of his business. No specific rules are set forth for the
merchant bailor. Finally, § 7-308 sets out the means of enforcing a car-
rier's lien, but does not establish any special criteria for public sales. The
relationship of these provisions to Article 9 is clear as a functional matter,
but it is doubtful that a court would follow these few standards for "public
sales" in applying Article 9 rules that apply to all kinds of personal prop-
erty. Compare §§ 2-102, -105, 7-102(1) (f), 9-102.
Probably the security agreement can establish standards for a "public
sale" as to time, place, notice, and manner of bidding if such standards
are not "manifestly unreasonable." §§ 1-102, 9-501. It is quite possible
that, in the absence of such a contract provision, the courts might look
to the security statutes repealed by the Code as guides for "public sales,"
e.g., UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT § 19, or to the law governing
sales on execution after a judgment. No cases could be located that de-
fined the difference between public and private sale under UNIFORM
TRUST RECEIPTS ACT § 6.
A recent bill in the California Senate contained the following amendment
to § 9-504(3) on the question of public sale:
Notice of the time and place of a public sale shall also be given at
least five days before the date of sale by publication once in a news-
paper of general circulation published in the county in which the sale
is to be held. Any public sale shall be held in the county or place
specified in the security agreement, or if no county or place is speci-
fied in the security agreement, in the county in which the collateral or
any part thereof is located or in the county in which the debtor has his
residence or chief place of business, or in the county in which the
secured party has his residence or a place of business if the debtor does
not have a residence or chief place of business within this State. If the
collateral is located outside this State or has been removed from this
State, a public sale may be held in the locality in which the collateral
is located. Any public sale may be postponed from time to time by
public announcement at the time and place first noticed for the sale
or by public announcement at the time and place to which the sale
may have been postponed . . . . Any sale of which notice is delivered
or mailed and published as herein provided and which is held as herein
provided is a public sale.
Cal. S. 1093 (1961).
108. S 9-504(3).
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associated with control. But, on the other hand, the courts should
be slow in adopting any general requirements that the secured
party should sell in parcels in order to obtain the greater profit
that might be associated with a retail sale as distinguished from
a wholesale disposition. A sensible lender may well realize that
breaking the collateral down into small segments and making
individual sales will only serve to increase the expense of the
disposition to the breaking point.
Article 9 itself makes clear that a transfer for security purposes
is not a bulk transfer under Article 6, which sets up the Code
standards for warning creditors of an impending bulk transfer
outside of the ordinary course of business."0 9 Nothing is said in
Article 9, however, about disposition after a default. This apparent
gap in the law is filled by section 6-103, which particularly
exempts from the bulk transfer provisions "transfers in settlement
or realization of a lien or other security interest." Consequently,
the secured party need not concern himself with complying with
the details of Article 6 when he disposes of collateral on a bulk
basis after default.
2. Application of the Proceeds of the Disposition
In the first subsection of section 9-504, the Code states the
order of distribution of the proceeds resulting from the disposition
as follows: (1) realization expenses; (2) payment of the in-
debtedness secured by the interest under which the disposition
was made; and (3) payment of certain subordinate interests
where such junior claimants (a) make an adequate demand for
their shares and (b) when requested, seasonably provide reason-
able proof of their interest in the collateral. The second subsection
of section 9-504 requires the secured party to account to the
debtor for any surplus and, unless otherwise agreed, the debtor
is liable for any deficiency."
(a) Realization Expenses
First to be satisfied from the proceeds are the reasonable ex-
penses of retaking, holding, preparing for sale, selling, and the
like, and, to the extent provided in the security agreement and
not prohibited by law, the reasonable attorneys' fees and legal
expenses incurred by the secured party. The expenses of retaking,
holding, and selling the collateral are commonly found in security
109. § 9-111.
110. For the special rule governing sales of certain intangibles, see text
accompanying notes 194-204 infra.
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statutes.11' The drafters of the Code indicate that running up
these expenses by delaying a resale might be a violation of the
standard of commercial reasonableness."' It is probable that
expenses of leasing or other types of disposition authorized in
subsection one are covered by the use of the omnibus language
"and the like" in paragraph (a) of the same section."'
In furtherance of the policy of encouraging private disposition
through regular commercial channels, the Code also authorizes
the secured party to prepare or process the collateral prior to
disposition and to recover the reasonable expenses of preparing
the collateral for sale." 4 Of course, subsection one of section
9-505 makes the authorization contingent upon the commercial
reasonableness of the processing or preparation. Finishing work
in process in a factory to realize a higher market value from com-
pleted goods than from a salvage operation or the servicing and
conditioning of a repossessed automobile by a dealer is most
probably commercially reasonable.
The Code follows those cases that permit recovery of reasonable
attorneys' fees and legal expenses by the secured party where the
security agreement so provides."' It is noteworthy that the lan-
guage of the statute rather candidly indicates by its use of the
plural "attorneys' fees" that in some situations, as where trials
111. UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT § 21; UNIFORM TRUST RE-
CEIPTS ACT § 6(3).
112. § 9-504, comment 6.
113. New York's enactment makes it clear that the expenses associated
with a leasing are covered. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 553, § 9-504(1) (a)
(effective Sept. 27, 1964).
114. In § 9-504(1), the Code permits "any commercially reasonable
preparation or processing," while in subsection (1) (a) processing expenses
are not explicitly mentioned. It is difficult to believe that a different treat-
ment was intended in connection with what is authorized and with what
expenses may be recovered.
115. Attitudes toward attorneys' fees vary. Massachusetts has had con-
siderable appellate litigation under a pre-Code conditional sales statute
requiring a contract term allowing the deduction of the "reasonable Ce-
penses of such repossession and sale." Lepore v. Atlantic Corp., 337 Mass.
92, 148 N.E.2d 279 (1958) (express provision for 15% of amount due as
attorney's fees; seller did not lose security because statutory clause in-
cluded, and was prefaced by, "anything herein contained to the contrary
notwithstanding . . ."); National Cash Register Co. v. Warner, 335 Mass.
736, 142 N.E.2d 584 (1957) (provision for "reasonable expenses of re-
possession and sale, including attorney's fees"; seller did not lose security);
Clark v. A & J Transp. Co., 330 Mass. 327, 113 N.E.2d 228 (1953) (pro-
vision for "reasonable expenses for retaking, repairing, and selling such
property, including a reasonable attorney's fee"; seller lost security). New
York seemed to regard the attorney's fee as recoverable even without a
contract provision. Triple Cities Constr. Corp. v. Byqrs Mach. Co., 259
App. Div. 451, 19 N.Y.S.2d 709, appeal denied, 259 App. Div. 955, 201
N.Y.S.2d 844 (1940).
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and appeals are necessary or where a number of jurisdictions are
involved, more than one attorney may be needed. The term "legal
expenses" is not defined, but at a minimum it would appear to
permit recovery of something more than the limited amount usually
associated with costs.
(b) Satisfaction of the Indebtedness Secured
Ordinarily this amount will not be difficult to ascertain where
there is a default in payment either of a single payment loan or
of an installment under a contract with an acceleration provision.
When the Code's more liberal rules dealing with description of
the debt 16  and collateral,17  future advances," s and after-
acquired property" 9 are fully utilized, troublesome questions may
arise as to precisely what is the indebtedness secured by the
particular security interest. This is another reason for making
the description of the collateral and of the debt as specific as
practicable despite the Code recognition of more general terms
in the agreement.
(c) Satisfaction of Subordinate Security Interests
Since any subordinate security interest is discharged by the
disposition," ° the Code here provides a means by which junior
secured creditors may participate in the proceeds of the liquidation.
The right of participation is conditioned by two requirements im-
116. Nothing is required in the public records regarding the amount
of the debt under § 9-402. Further, the formalities for the security agree-
ment itself do not include any requirement that the debt be mentioned.
§§ 9-203-04. It may not be wise to take advantage of these liberties
in all cases. See Coogan, The Lazy Lawyer's Guide to Secured Transactions
Under the Code, 60 MicH. L. Rnv. 685, 701 (1962).
117. § 9-110 validates any description "whether or not it is specific
if it reasonably identifies what is described."
118. § 9-204(5) states that "obligations covered by a security agree-
ment may include future advances or other value whether or not the ad-
vances or value are given pursuant to commitment."
119. § 9-204 generally makes security agreements covering future
goods effective without any additional intervening act by the secured party.
Coupled with the first-to-file priority rule of § 9-312 and the abolition
of the "dominion rule" in § 9-205, this section generally effectuates after-
acquired property clauses. See Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code:, Priorities Among Secured Creditors and the "Floating
Lien," 72 HAnv. L. REv. 838 (1959). For the limitation on such clauses
protecting purchase money security interests, see Hogan, Financing the
Acquisition of New Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 3 B.C.
IND. & CoM. L. REv. 115 (1962).
120. § 9-504(4). Unfortunately, no mention is made of the distribution
of the proceeds to other lien creditors in § 9-504(1) (c) even though these
liens are also discharged. Marsh & Robinson, Some Observations on Arti-
cle 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 63 DICK. L. REv. 45, 55 (1958).
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posed upon the junior secured creditor. First, the subordinate
creditor must place in the hands of the holder of the security in-
terest under which the disposition is made a written notification
of a demand for his share.' The mere dispatch of the notice
is not enough because the language of the statute clearly requires
receipt by the senior secured creditor. Another factor affecting
the timing of this notice is that it must be received "before dis-
tribution of the proceeds is completed."' 2 The New York re-
vision of the Code adds language limiting the realizing secured
party's responsibility to the junior creditors to the proceeds un-
distributed when the notification is received.2 3 At first blush
the New York modification may seem to be a minor one; but it
makes clear that a secured party, A, who had realized $10,000
upon the collateral, satisfied $9,000 worth of expenses and
debt, and turned over $900 to junior creditor C, would not be
in peril if he received a written notice from junior creditor B de-
manding $800 and claiming priority over C."M Although it seems
unlikely that a court would allow B to recover from A in this
situation, the Code literally creates a doubt, and the variation
seems to be a sensible resolution of that doubt. The second con-
dition placed upon the junior secured party seeking to share in
the proceeds gives the realizing secured creditor the right to re-
quire reasonable proof of the junior interest. 2 The junior holder
must comply with such a demand seasonably.'26 It will probably
be sufficient for the junior party to furnish a copy of his security
agreement covering the collateral.
As indicated by the earlier discussion of notice of a proposed re-
tention, the foreclosing secured party must notify other secured
creditors who are known to him or who have filed an appropriate
financing statement in the state where the realization occurs. 27
Since notice of disposition may be excused 2s and since there may
be other secured parties with a perfected security interest who
have not filed in the particular state,2 9 some or all junior creditors
121. § 9-504(l) (c).
122. Ibid.
123. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 553, § 9-504(1)(c) (effective Sept.
27, 1964).
124. New York amended § 9-504(1)(c) further by adding a provision
whereby the realizing secured party is entitled to "a sufficient indemnity
bond" from the junior secured party.
125. § 9-504(1)(c).
126. "Seasonably" is defined in § 1-204.
127. § 9-504(3). See text following note 149 infra.
128. § 9-504(3). See text accompanying note 140 infra.
129. Apart from the pledge, several other nonpossessory security in-
terests are perfected without filing-some purchase-money security in-
terests in consumer goods and farm equipment under § 9-302(1) (c)-(d);
interests in "proceeds" under § 9-306 and negotiable documents under
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may be unaware of the proceedings. Apparently, the Code considers
that in comparison to the heavy burden that would be placed upon
foreclosing secured parties if all were entitled to notice in all cases,
the burden on junior creditors who will not be entitled to notice
is not great. This conclusion is probably sound because disposition
proceedings will seldom generate any excess in any event.
3. Purchasers at Disposition
(a) Protection Afforded
To implement further the two basic Code policies of encouraging
dispositions at the highest practicable price and protecting in-
nocent purchasers, section 9-504(4) safeguards the purchaser in
the realization proceedings. All of the debtor's rights are con-
ferred upon the purchaser for value, and all subordinate security
interests or liens are discharged. Of course, the security interest
under which the disposition is made is also discharged.
In addition to the requirement that the purchaser must pay
value, the Code requires that he must have a certain state of mind.
One who buys at a private sale is protected if he acts in good
faith, which requires that he be honest in all respects. 3 It was
apparently intended to require less of the public-sale purchaser,
who must have no knowledge of any defects in the sale and who
must not act in collusion with the secured party, other bidders,
or the person conducting the sale.' 3 ' The draftsmen's comments
indicate that the purchaser at the public sale is protected as
long as he is not acting in bad faith and that he is put under
no duty to inquire into the circumstances of the sale.1 2 One can
infer that the purchaser at the private sale must act affirmatively
in order to obtain the same protection. The distinction between
acting in good faith and the absence of bad faith has long troubled
the law. It has been abandoned elsewhere in the Code as impracti-
cable.' 3 Nothing in section 9-504(4) is offered to rebut that
judgment, and the distinction here may also prove troublesome.
§ 9-304. On filing generally, see Coogan, Public Notice Under the Uni-
form Commercial Code and Other Recent Chattel Security Laws, Including
"Notice Filing," 47 IowA L. REV. 289 (1962). For discussion of the
purchase-money security interest, see Hogan, Financing the Acquisition
of New Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 3 B.C. IND. &
CoM. L. REV. 115 (1962).
130. § 1-201(19).
131. § 9-504(4). The secured party's liability for warranty of title is
also made less troublesome by this section. See §§ 2-312, 9-504(l).
132. § 9-504, comment 4.
133. Compare UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INsTRumENTs LAw § 52, with
§§ 3-302, -304. See 2 NEw YoRK LAw REviSION COMMISSION, STUDY
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(b) The Secured Party as a Purchaser
If the secured party fears that a public sale is not bringing a
sufficiently high price for the collateral, he is often prepared to
bid for the property himself. In such cases the Code authorizes
the secured party to purchase. 3 ' This is not the only case where
the secured party may be the buyer; again there is a "recognized
market exception."' 35 When the collateral is of a type customari-
ly sold in such a market, the secured party may be a purchaser.
Apparently, the Code takes the position that a sale in a recognized
market will itself reveal that the secured party is not obtaining
a windfall. Fairness is assured by the operation of the market.
The same reason seems to be behind the permission to purchase
granted to the secured party where the collateral is of a type that
is the subject of widely-distributed standard price quotations.130
An interesting question is presented by the interrelationship
between these provisions authorizing the secured party to purchase
and subsection four of section 9-504, which protects certain
purchasers for value. Will the secured party be able to claim the
protections afforded if he is a purchaser for value? Since one of
the major aims of the protections rule seems to be the safeguarding
of an innocent third party when the secured party fails to comply
with the applicable law, it would appear that the secured party
should not be able to cloak himself in the mantle provided for
strangers. Even when the secured party buys at a public sale and
when he is honest in fact, if he has failed to comply with the re-
quirements of the Code, he probably should not be insulated from
the debtor's claims. 37
4. Notice of the Disposition
The reader who delights in the prose of the notice portion of
the newspaper classified advertisements or the bulletin board of
the courthouse will be disappointed to learn that the Code de-
mands no public notice of a proposed disposition.'38 Few others
OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65, at 903-07(1955).
134. § 9-504(3).
135. See the discussion of the concept "recognized market" in text
accompanying notes 89-94 supra.
136. § 9-504(3).
137. § 9-506 may also permit redemption by the debtor in such cases.
See text accompanying note 169 infra.
138. For the concept of a "public sale," see text accompanying notes
101-07 supra. The commercially reasonable standard (see text accom-
panying note 77 supra) or installment sales legislation may demand such
a notice. Installment sales legislation is usually consumer-oriented and may
occasionally call for certain formalities on default. See Hogan, A Survey
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will be distressed. Little improvement in the size of the group
interested in buying the property results from such notices. In
the majority of cases under the Code, individual notices must be
dispatched to the debtor and, except in cases involving consumer
goods, to other secured parties.'39
(a) When Notice is Excused
In some cases the secured party is excused from the obligation
to send any notice of the disposition. When the goods are perish-
able or threaten to decline speedily in value, notice is not de-
manded. 40 However, even in these situations it may be practi-
cable and desirable to notify the debtor and appropriate junior
secured parties of the time of the rushed sale. This approach will
eliminate one possible argument in attacking the sale. In addition
to permitting crash sales to avoid further loss, the Code also ex-
cuses notice where the collateral is of a type customarily sold on
a "recognized market."'' Where notice of the sale is not given,
one can expect that the secured party will claim that the goods
fall within the recognized market exception. Until the meaning
of that term is more completely elaborated by case law,1 2 the
wise counseling point here is to send the notices and avoid the
risk of liability for violating the Code requirements.'
In one situation, where the secured party is from the outset
in possession of the collateral as pledgee, the Code rules excusing
notice may appear to work an unfair hardship upon the debtor.
Since the debtor in default is not warned of the impending sale
of his collateral by reason of repossession nor by any notice of the
disposition, he is effectively deprived of exercising his right of
redemption at any time prior to the sale.'" In a sense, this rule
does little more than is accomplished by most collateral note
forms under pre-Code law. Notice of any disposition is usually
waived in such cases. 45 However, it is possible that collateral
of State Retail Instalment Sales Legislation, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 38, 59-65
(1958). A note to § 9-503 calls for the repeal of these default rules even
though the Code generally purports to permit the regulatory legislation to
control. §§ 9-201, -203.
139. Oklahoma does not provide the exception for consumer goods.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-504 (Supp. 1961).
140. § 9-504(3).
141. Ibid.
142. See discussion of "recognized market" accompanying notes 89-94
supra.
143. § 9-507(1).
144. § 9-506. Unfortunately, the difference betveen the possessory
and nonpossessory security interest has been deliberately ignored. § 9-501,
comment 2.
145. See Note, 66 YAL.E L.J. 257, 258 (1956). Compare Seasongood,
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of a type sold in a recognized market may be disposed of without
notice to the debtor at the market price, but at a time when the
market is rising. Will the secured party be able in this situation
to avoid a claim that the failure of the pledgee to notify the debtor
was a breach of the obligation to make every aspect of the dis-
position commercially reasonable? The debtor who had no chance
to redeem because no notice was given can claim that as a result
of the disposition he lost the benefit of the rising market. This is
a hard case. On one side the statutory language excusing notice
is explicit and may be said to control the more general reference
to commercial reasonableness. Nonetheless, it is clear from re-
peated reference in the comments that every aspect of the dis-
position is to be tested by commercial reasonableness."' For
the counselor, it once again seems best to avoid the risk by sending
notices and, where possible, eliminating the issue from litigation.
(b) Time and Method of Making the Notice
The text of the Code merely specifies that there must be reason-
able notice of the time and place of any public sale and reasonable
notice of the time after which any private sale or other intended
disposition is to be made.' This leaves open a question as to
the minimum waiting period required between the notice and the
public sale or the time after which another disposition will take
place. Both the term "reasonable notification" and the general
demand for commercial reasonableness as to the time of the dis-
position require some period of time between the dispatch of the
notice and the sale. The Uniform Conditional Sales Act required
ten days' notice of the sale,"' and this may well continue to be
a rough rule of thumb in the absence of special circumstances,
such as a declining market, that require a shorter notice.
To avoid the problem, it is probably wise to specify some
notice period in the security agreement at the time of the credit
extension. Under section 9-501 (3), the parties may determine
standards by which the nonvariable rights of the debtor and
duties of the secured party may be measured. Such standards in
the agreement may not be manifestly unreasonable. Consequently.
one should avoid specifying excessively short periods between the
notice and the sale. When the period specified in the pre-Code
Drastic Pledge Agreements, 29 HARV. L. REV. 277, 281 (1916); Vincens,
A Perilous Path for Pledgees, Bus. Law, April 1956, p. 22.
146. Comments to §§ 9-502-04, -507.
147. § 9-504(3).
148. UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT § 19. The Uniform Trust
Receipts Act called for a five-day notice. UNIFORM TRUST RECEIPTS
ACT § 6.
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uniform acts is used in the security agreement, the secured party
may immunize himself from a claim that the period is manifestly
unreasonable. Within the same limitations, the security agreement
may also set the standards for the place at which and the means
by which such notices are to be delivered to the debtor. 4 '
(c) Group Entitled to Notice of the Disposition
As in the case of notice of a proposed retention of the col-
lateral in satisfaction of the obligation, the secured party who is
required to send notice of the disposition must notify the debtor
and, except in the case of consumer goods, certain other secured
parties." ° The secured parties entitled to notice are defined here,
as in the retention situation, as those known to the realizing
creditor and those who have duly filed a financing statement
indexed in the name of the debtor in the state.' The question
of the time when the group is ascertained is left open here in the
same fashion as in the case of a retention of the collateral in satis-
faction of the indebtedness. The answer here should be the same,
and the class to be notified should be fixed when the notices are
first dispatched. 5 -
IV. REDEMPTION
Since the basic purpose of any kind of security device is to
assure payment of the debt, the Code does not limit to any set
period the debtor's power to pay the debt and ransom the col-
lateral. Furthermore, the Code recognizes the interest of junior
secured creditors in the collateral by conferring upon them the
right to redeem."m Four ways are open under the Code to termi-
149. Probably the junior secured parties entitled to notice would also
be bound by such standards on the basis of the fact that they take their
interest subject to the terms of the senior security agreement. Note, how-
ever, that under the first-to-file rule of § 9-312(5), the senior secured
party may obtain priority by filing much in advance of any agreement.
§§ 9-203, -303, -402. In an appropriate case the junior party may
be able to argue that the agreement creating the prior security interest
and establishing the standards was not even in existence at the time the
junior party took his interest. Nonetheless, practicality would seem to
require that the junior party be bound by the standards imposed by a
senior creditor's security agreement under § 9-501 (3).
150. See text accompanying note 49 supra. If the secured party knows
that a third person is the owner of the collateral, notice must be sent to
that owner. § 9-112.
151. §§ 9-504(3),-505(2).
152. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
153. § 9-506. Section 9-112 specifically permits a third party who
is known to the secured party as the owner of the collateral the same
right as the debtor to redeem. Despite a possible contrary inference from
the statutory language, it is hard to believe that an owner would not have
the right to redeem even when he is not known to the secured party.
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nate the right to redeem: (1) disposition of the collateral; (2)
making of a contract of disposition; (3) satisfaction of the secured
obligation by retention of the collateral under section 9-505(2);
(4) making of a written agreement with the debtor or other se-
cured party after default.'-
In some cases, the debtor will profit because his right to re-
deem will be continued beyond the statutory periods set by pre-
Code law.1"5 Nonetheless, in other situations the debtor may
find that the collateral has been sold promptly after repossession
or default. In these latter cases, the Code may somewhat reduce
the power of redemption. Apparently, the only safeguard extended
to the debtor in these circumstances is that the sale must be com-
mercially reasonable, and in some cases speedy disposition may
violate that standard. For example, a sale made without testing
the market at all may effectively cut off the debtor's right
to redeem, but make the secured party liable under section 9-507
(1). Indirectly, where notice of the time of disposition is required.
the debtor will be able to redeem at any time prior to the actual
sale. In these cases, therefore, ascertaining the meaning of "com-
inercial reasonableness" and of "reasonable notification" may well
involve consideration of the debtor's right to redeem.
A word for word reading of section 9-506 might permit the
secured party to make a contract for the disposition of the col-
lateral any time after default. Such a contract might possibly
be entered into even before repossession of the collateral. Thus,
the debtor would find his equity destroyed by the secured party's
action taken prior to repossession. Although this is a possible
reading of the statute, one is ill-advised if he attempts to follow
such a course of conduct. This is the kind of case where the com-
mercially reasonable standard might take its biggest bite. It cannot
be emphasized too often that secured lenders as a class may find
the commercially reasonable test as interpreted by the courts a
stringent one if individual secured parties take short cuts in the
realization process. Part 5 of Article 9 gives secured creditors
154. Doubtless the debtor may renounce his right after default, both
where a compulsory resale is required under § 9-505(1) and where re-
demption is permitted under § 9-506. Whether after default he may re-
nounce lesser rights conferred upon him by the Code is more obscure.
Only in § 9-505(1) is the broad question touched upon, and it states t'r.
duty of compulsory disposition where the debtor "has not signed after
default a statement renouncing or modifying his rights under this Part."
The implication here authorizes other modifications as to the details of
the sale and so forth. Compare UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT 8 26.
155. Compare UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT §§ 17, 18, where
the riaht to redeem is limited to ten days after retaking and may be cut
off entirely by a notice before repossession.
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considerable flexibility, but it has built into its provisions a tool
whereby judge-made developments may restrain the secured party.
The kind of caution expressed in relation to contracts of dis-
position made prior to default is also relevant elsewhere. As in-
dicated in the discussion of the Code requirements for making
a disposition, there is specific recognition of dispositions by sale,
lease, or otherwise.15 If the secured party utilizes a lease or
some form of bailment and retains the interest of lessor or
bailor himself, he may take comfort in the thought that under
section 9-506 the debtor's right to redeem has been terminated
by the disposition. Despite the language of the statute, it is a
practical certainty that courts accustomed to years of watchful
concern for the debtor's equity will protect the debtor who pays
the obligation and seeks to recover whatever interest the secured
party has retained after the disposition. 57
Similarly, one wonders if many courts will not permit the debtor
who has defaulted in the payment of a single installment to redeem
by the payment of that installment.' The comments state a policy
that the debtor should be required to pay all of the obligation
as a condition to redemption.'59 Thus in the presence of an
adequately drafted acceleration clause, the debtor would seem to
be required to pay the full amount of the debt in order to redeem.
The statutory language is not so specific, however, and may pro-
voke litigation over the question of whether the defaulted payment
or the whole debt must be paid. 6 '
V. CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLATION
OF THE CODE STANDARDS
In an attempt to permit the secured party to proceed with re-
alization in confidence, section 9-507(2) sets out some particu-
156. § 9-504(l).
157. The common-law conditional sale was the only device that over-
looked the debtor's right to redeem. See, e.g., Newport Motor Sales Inc.
v. Bove Chevrolet Inc., 84 R.I. 195, 122 A.2d 167 (1956); Note, 17
MINN. L. REv. 66 (1932). See also MINN. STAT. § 511.19 (1961) for
a limited statutory redemption for ten days after retaking where the seller
fails to notify the buyer of repossession.
158. See Annot., 67 A.L.R. 1554 (1930); cf. Street v. Commercial
Credit Co., 35 Ariz. 479, 281 Pac. 46 (1929); Clark v. Tri-State Discount
Co., 151 Misc. 679, 271 N.Y. Supp. 779 (Sup. CL 1934); Cox v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 59 S.D. 588, 241 N.W. 609 (1932).
159. § 9-506, comment. No mention is made in § 9-506 of the right
to accelerate under § 1-208.
160. The debtor may redeem "by tendering fulfillment of all obligations
secured by the collateral. . . ." § 9-506. (Emphasis added.) UNIFORM
CONrITIONAL SALE-s AcT § 18 calls for "payment or tender of the amount
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larized tests of commercial reasonableness. 6' For the same pur-
pose, the debtor and other secured parties are given the right to
test before its consummation any disposition that they consider
to be in violation of the Code requirements. 62 Of course, the
Code requires that the person attacking the disposition must
"establish" the secured party's failure to follow the Code rules.
If the courts follow this statutory invitation, the ability to inter-
fere with prospective dispositions may work to the secured party's
advantage. At least in the business loan where the protected group
sits back with full knowledge of a disposition and fails to make
use of this right to test the case in advance, the secured party can
argue that the burden of establishing any loss caused by non-
compliance should be stringent. 6 '
Only in the case of consumer goods does the Code require a
minimum liability for failure to comply with the Code standards.
The consumer-debtor may recover "in any event an amount not
less than the credit service charge plus ten per cent of the principal
amount of the debt or the time price differential plus ten per cent
of the cash price."' 64 In consumer transactions, the amount of
the debt is often small and losses are hard to prove, and therefore,
the Code creates this minimum recovery. One can surmise that,
because of the difficulty of proof, this minimum may usually be
the maximum, and the secured party can safely predict the extent
of his liability here. In the business transaction, including farm
financings, the complaining party must clearly show both the viola-
tion of the Code requirement and the extent of the resulting loss."'6
The statutory language does not attach loss of the security to
a violation of the Code standards, and this is made explicit in
section 9-207(3), dealing with the secured party's liability for
violation of his duty while in possession of the collateral as a
pledgee or upon repossession after a default.'66 The relationship
of the debtor's right to redeem and a violation of the Code's require-
ments is less certain. For example, the redemption section pro-
vides that the debtor or any other secured party may redeem at
any time before "the obligation has been discharged under Section
due under the contract at the time of retaking and interest." See Davis,
The Law of Secured Transactions and Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 6 S.D.L. REV. 173, 209 (1961); cf. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 511.19(3) (1961).
161. See text accompanying note 79 supra.
162. § 9-507(1). See Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article of
the Commercial Code, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 27, 43-44 (1951).
163. Gilmore, supra note 73, at 11; see § 9-112.
164. § 9-507(1).
165. Gilmore, supra note 73, at 11.
166. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
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9-505 (2)." The cited section relates to retention of the collateral
by the secured party in satisfaction of the obligation and sets forth
certain requirements for notice and for a waiting period. 67 No
definite statement appears in the Code in connection with the
effect of a defectively attempted retention upon the right to redeem.
However, one can argue that in such cases the debtor's obligation
is not discharged and, consequently, that his right to redeem re-
mains unimpaired."6 Certainly the debtor will be able to redeem
when the secured party proposes retention in a transaction where
a sale of the collateral is compulsory. 69
A more difficult case arises when the secured party disposes
of the collateral and the Code requirements are violated. The
disposition portion of the redemption rule merely requires action
to redeem before "the secured party has disposed of collateral
or entered into a contract for its disposition under Section 9-504."
No other mention is made of the standards established for a dis-
position in section 9-504. Consequently, it is possible to argue
that even a defective disposition cuts off the right to redeem. In
support of this position one can also assert that section 9-507 (1),
establishing the liability of the secured parties, is the exclusive
remedy for violation of the requirements of the section."' 0
Of course, when the purchaser at the disposition qualifies for
the protections specified in section 9-504(4), the purchaser will
clearly be safeguarded against the debtor's claim of redemption.
However, the fact that protection is extended only to a certain
class of purchasers is some argument that a defective disposition
does not cut off the debtor's redemption right in some cases. If
the secured party himself purchases and violates the Code require-
ments, redemption will probably remain available.
VI. SPECIAL RULES DEPENDENT UPON THE NATURE
OR USE OF THE COLLATERAL
Although the default provisions might first appear to be drafted
upon the assumption that all security interests are the same, dis-
tinctions are made in the treatment of various kinds of collateral.
167. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
168. An interesting question arising from the argument stated in the
text relates to the effect of failure to notify a junior secured party under
§§ 9-504(3) or 9-505(2). Will this defect in the secured party's conduct
of the default proceedings enable the debtor to redeem?
169. § 9-505(1). See text accompanying note 171 infra.
170. This conclusion suffers from the fact that § 1-106 should grant
a specific remedy to a debtor who is prevented from redeeming by the
secured party. Thus it can be argued that § 9-507(1) is not the exclusive
remedy for violation of the standards of Part 5 of Article 9.
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A. CONSUMER GOODS
The first such category consists of consumer goods, and the
most significant special rule calls for a compulsory disposition of
consumer goods in specified cases.'71 The general Code rule
does not set a mandatory period for disposition, but, when the
debtor has paid sixty per cent of the debt,'72 the secured party
must dispose of consumer goods within ninety days after he takes
possession. The section is patterned upon the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act, where the seller must resell within thirty days of a re-
taking if the buyer has paid fifty per cent of the price. Under
the Code the right of redemption is preserved until the disposi-
tion.Y4 The secured party's obligation to make a compulsory
disposition cannot be disclaimed in the security agreement.15 On
the other hand, the Code recognizes a renunciation or modification
of the right to such a disposition after default.1'7  Frequently,
such a waiver may be in the debtor's interest, and he may thus
avoid the possibility of a liability for a deficiency. In the same
connection, after default the debtor may also contract away his
right to redeem. 7
The general Code treatment of the obligations of a secured
party requires that a notice of any disposition or of a proposed
retention must be sent to other secured creditors who have filed
or who are known to the secured party, 8 but such notice is
excused in consumer transactions.7 9 There is support for this
approach on three bases. First, each consumer transaction involves
a relatively small amount and must be treated in a standardized
fashion by financing agencies. Second, the realization of excess
proceeds in these cases is probably relatively rare in any event.
Third, the duty to notify other secured parties who have filed
appropriately would be relatively ineffectual as to consumer goods
since the most significant group of such interests is perfected
without filing by reason of the special purchase-money rule.""0
In consumer goods transactions, the secured party's liability
171. § 9-505(1).
172. The section actually refers to sixty per cent of the loan and sixty
per cent of the cash price to cover both purchase-money arrangements
and straight loans.
173. UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT § 19.
174. § 9-506.
175. § 9-501(3)(c).
176. § 9-505(1).
177. Whether such a post-default waiver of the right to redeem affects
other secured creditors is not specified. § 9-506.
178. §§ 9-504(3), -505(2).
179. Ibid. See note 139 supra for Oklahoma variation.
180. § 9-302(1)(c), (d).
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for violation of the Code requirements is expressed alternatively.
The usual recovery of any loss caused by the violation is permitted;
further, in consumer transactions there is a minimum recovery of
the credit service charge plus ten per cent of the principal amount
of the debt or the time price differential plus ten per cent of the
cash price.' This is another rule which cannot be varied by
agreement. s2 Moreover, for violation of the compulsory disposi-
tion requirement, the creditor financing consumer goods may be
liable alternatively for conversion."m
B. EQUIPMENT
In an attempt to reduce the expenses of realization, the Code
permits a secured party to render equipment unusable in lieu of
removal and to dispose of such collateral on the debtor's prem-
ises." Heavy equipment is particularly suitable for this tech-
nique, which eliminates the costs of removal and storage of such
equipment, thereby reducing the possibility of a deficiency and
enhancing the realization of the full amount of the debt. However,
the draftsmen did not here intend to confer an unlimited power
upon the secured party."m All of the secured party's actions in
connection with a disposition must be "commercially reason-
able."' 6 If the debtor has a business need for the space occupied
by the collateral or if the premises of the debtor are not adequate
to permit his continued operation, the secured party may be re-
quired to remove the collateral. There is also the obvious practical
problem arising from the fact that the debtor who continues in
possession after default may wrongfully dispose of the collateral.2s7
Further difficulty stems from the possible objection by the
debtor to the entry upon his premises of the secured party either
181. § 9-507(1).
182. § 9-501(3) (e).
183. § 9-505(1).
184. § 9-503.
185. § 9-503,comment.
186. The comment to § 9-503 states that § 9-504(3) requires that
every action by the secured party in connection with a disposition must
be taken in a commercially reasonable manner. One might otherwise argue,
however, that repossession is separate from disposition and thus outside
of the Code rules requiring disposition to be "commercially reasonable."
Compare § 9-503 with § 9-504.
187. Under § 9-306(2), the secured party's interest in the collateral
continues even after such a sale except where the Article "otherwise
provides." Section 9-307(1), protecting buyers in ordinary course of busi-
ness against even perfected security interests, and § 9-307(2), protecting
certain buyers against unfiled but perfected security interests obviously
limit the general rule. Noncompliance with the Statute of Frauds provision
also makes the interest ineffective against third parties. § 9-203(1).
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at the time the collateral is to be rendered unusable or at the time
of the sale. Although the statute does not require the use of legal
process in these circumstances, it appears to be appropriate to
resort to legal action, particularly where a breach of the peace
is threatened. But what kind of action is available? Of course, the
secured party could still resort to an enforcement of his right to
possession, but this approach begs the question of enforcing the
special rule as to equipment. Is the secured party given some
sort of real property right to enter on the premises? Is that right
irrevocable? To what extent is the right effective against holders
of interest in the real property? What is the effect of a contract
provision waiving any trespass associated with the secured party's
entry? All of these questions must be answered under non-Code
law, although section 1-106(2) states that any right or obligation
declared by this Act is enforceable by action unless the provision
declaring it specifies a different and limited effect.
C. GOODS COVERED BY DOCUMENTS
The default provisions rather laconically state that if the col-
lateral consists of documents, the secured party may proceed either
as to the documents or as to the goods covered thereby.1 8 This
special default rule is a natural outgrowth of the notion that per-
fection of a security interest in documents automatically perfects
a security interest in the goods covered thereby.8 9 There is more
to the problem, however. The secured party cannot conclude that
the special default rule entitles him to seize the goods covered by
the document in the hands of the carrier or the warehouse. Too
much other law is brought into play to permit such an inference.
The rights of a holder to whom a negotiable document of title
has been duly negotiated are not limited by anything in Article
9.'9 Consequently, the creditor secured by a negotiable docu-
ment must proceed against the document to eliminate the pos-
sibility of an intervening holder.' 91 Furthermore, the person in
possession of the goods will be particularly concerned with his
obligation to cancel a negotiable document.'92 The secured party
188. § 9-501(1). "Documents" in Article 9 are "documents of title"
as defined in § 1-201(15) (See § 9-105(e)) and will be controlled by
Article 7, which replaces the UNIFORM BILLS OF LADING ACT and the
UNIFORM WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS ACT. I
189. See § 9-304(2).
190. § 9-309.
191. § 9-304(1) permits filing to perfect a security interest in negotiable
documents, but by reason of § 9-309, the filing has no effect upon a
"holder to whom a negotiable document of title has been duly negotiated."
See § 7-501.
192. The bailee must conspicuously note any partial deliveries. § 7-403
(3).
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will not improve his position as to negotiable documents by at-
tempting to foreclose on the goods by judgment and levy of execu-
tion since section 7-602 then requires the surrender of the docu-
ment or an injunction against negotiation. In other situations in-
volving documents, the bailee may deliver to the foreclosing se-
cured party so long as this delivery is "rightful" as against the
claimant.193 As against the debtor and any junior party, the
delivery would probably be permitted.
D. A THIRD-PARTY'S UNDERTAKING: INTANGMLES
When someone else's promise or obligation is the collateral,
the secured party is given the right to collect from the third party.
Section 9-502 authorizes the secured party to notify an account
debtor or the obligor on an instrument to make payment to him
and to take control of proceeds under section 9-306. The secured
party is entitled to act under this section whenever the agreement
permits him to do so and upon default.""g
The use of the term "account debtor" may cause some initial
difficulty. The definition section makes clear that the term includes
obligors under many kinds of collateral in addition to accounts.
The persons who are obligated upon chattel paper, a contract
right, or a general intangible are also included. 195 Thus, when
the term "account debtor" is added to the term "obligor on an
instrument,"' 96 it is clear that all forms of collateral bottomed
upon the undertaking of a third person are included."'
193. § 7-403(1) (a), (f).
194. It is customary for commentators to speak of a requirement of
default or nonperformance of the duty to which the assignment is related.
4 CoRBiN, CoNTRACTS § 881 (1951). If a sale of accounts is involved,
there is no need to require default. Acceleration clauses are not as signifi-
cant here because of the self-liquidating nature of the series of loans con-
templated. See Dunham, Inventory and Accounts Receivable Financing,
62 HARv. L. REv. 588, 595 (1949).
195. An account as defined in the Code is the right to payment that
has been earned, and a contract right is a right to payment that has notbeen earned. § 9-106. Neither of these terms include "chattel paper"(writings that evidence both a monetary obligation and a security interest
in, or a lease of, specific goods). § 9-105(1) (b). On this kind of collateral
generally, see Kripke, Chattel Paper as a Negotiable Specialty Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 59 YALE L.. 1209 (1950). "General in-
tangibles" represent all other kinds of personal property not covered in
the definitions of goods, accounts, contract rights, chattel paper, docu-
ments, and instruments. § 9-106.
196. An "instrument" in Code lexicon includes all negotiable instru-
ments under Article 3, all investment securities under Article 8, and any
other writing evidencing a right to the payment of money that in the ordi-
nary course of business is transferred by delivery. Chattel paper, security
agreements, and leases are excluded from the definition in § 9-105(1) (g).
197. Under § 9-306(1), a secured party obtains a security interest
1962]
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The relatively liquid nature of this kind of collateral and the
fact that collection may be attempted without disruption of the
business activities of the debtor are cited as the reasons for per-
mitting the secured party to proceed to collect directly from the
various obligors.'98 Furthermore, the third party's promise will
normally be an undertaking to pay money, and problems of valua-
tion of the collateral will be minimized. 199 In some cases, however,
the debtor may be particularly affected by the secured party's
handling of the collections from the obligor. If the security agree-
ment permits a recovery of any deficiency from the debtor, and
the secured party compromises the claim with the account debtor
or the obligor of instrument, the debtor may be adversely af-
fected.2"0 Similarly, if the secured party is able to charge back
any uncollectible accounts to the debtor, the debtor has a real
interest in the techniques of collection used by the secured party.
In these situations the secured party must act in "a commercially
reasonable manner." '' On the other hand, where the transaction
involves no right of recourse against the debtor and no right to
charge back uncollectible accounts, the debtor and other third
parties have no legal interest affected by the secured party's con-
duct. The same sort of notion pervades the special rule as to the
debtor's liability for a deficiency. Where the secured transaction
is a sale of accounts, contract rights, or chattel paper, the debtor
is not made liable unless the security agreement provides for a
deficiency.0 2 In this kind of arrangement, the financing agency
in "proceeds" when collateral is "sold, exchanged, collected or otherwise
disposed of." Thus, even where the collateral covered by the security agree-
ment is originally tangible personal property, such as inventory, the re-
alization may ultimately be on accounts arising as proceeds.
198. § 9-502, comment 1.
199. Some difficulty may arise in determining the relationship of § 9-
502, which permits the secured party to notify the account debtor "to
make payment" to him, and § 9-106, which seems to permit the courts
to include promises in addition to the payment of money within the term
"general intangibles." See § 9-106, comment. It seems that the collection
rights of § 9-502 should be limited to situations where the collateral is
a promise to pay money.
200. See Rudolph, Secured Transactions Under the Commercial Code,
14 Wyo. L.J. 220, 236 (1960). A right of recourse may exist even where
the underlying transaction is a sale. § 9-502, comment 4.
201. § 9-502(2). Comment 3 to § 9-502 describes subsection two
as requiring the action "with due regard to the interest of the assignor
and of his other creditors." Section 9-507(2) will be useful in setting some
standards of "commercially reasonable" manner. See Andersen v. Ander-
son, 46 Wash. 2d 903, 280 P.2d 252 (1955) (assignee may settle for less
than face amount if he uses "utmost good faith").
202. Sales of "general intangibles" (§ 9-106) are not included within
this class since sales of such collateral are not covered by Article 9. §
9-102. A Statute of Frauds in § 1-206 will cover the outright transfer
of general intangibles.
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assumes the credit risk as to the third parties and calculates its
charges on that basis." 3 In other cases, the transaction merely
secures a debt and the debtor remains liable for the deficiency
as a matter of law under the statute.' Section 9-504(2) em-
phasizes this rule and provides the logical corollary that when the
debtor is liable for a deficiency, the secured party also has a duty
to account to the debtor for any surplus proceeds.
E. AGREEMENTS COVERING BOTH REAL AND PERSONAL
PROPERTY
Under subsection four of section 9-501, if the security agree-
ment covers both real and personal property, the secured party
may proceed as to both in accordance with his rights and remedies
in respect of the real property; the Code default rules are then
made inapplicable. Alternatively, the secured party may proceed
under the Code as to the personal property. The first alternative
procedure primarily seeks simplicity and speed in transactions
such as corporate indentures, where the collateral consists of
both real and personal property. -03 Moreover, if this method is
used, all questions of procedure will be referred to the non-Code
law of real property.0 ' Apparently, the procedure may involve
a judicial 'foreclosure or a foreclosure under a power of sale in
the security agreement.07 In either event, safeguards extended
to the debtor and other secured parties in the Code are not ap-
plicable, and these parties will be required to look to the realty
law for protection. Of course, the opposite is also true; the secured
party may be more restricted in his action to the extent that he
203. A succinct description of the sale type of arrangement is con-
tained in Greenberg, Inventory and Accounts Receivable Financing, 1956
U. ILL. L.F. 601, 616. The Code avoids the difficult fact question of
whether a given assignment is for security by including both sales and
security transfers within the scope of Article 9, making the filing and pri-
ority rules apply in either case. § 9-102. Upon default, however, the dis-
tinction must be made, and parol evidence may be used to show that an
absolute assignment was given for security purposes. Allen v. Home Nat'l
Bank, 120 Conn. 306, 180 At. 498 (1935); Lucius Beebe & Sons v. Wason,
274 Mass. 254, 174 N.E. 500 (1931).
204. § 9-502. In Miami Station Inc. v. Coplan Pipe & Supply Co.,
128 So. 2d 170 (Fla. App. 1961), the secured creditor made an unsuc-
cessful attempt to retain $98,000 when the debt was $31,000.
205. § 9-501, comment 5.
206. The duty to conduct the disposition in light of the standard of
"commercial reasonableness" may be avoided by resort to realty procedure
where more formal requirements as to notice and the conduct of the
sale may be established.
207. § 9-501(4) does not limit itself to judicial foreclosure; rather
the secured party may proceed "in accordance with his rights and remedies
in respect of the real property."
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will be unable to use the more flexible and less formal methods
of disposition permitted under the Code.208 On the other hand,
if the secured party chooses to do so, he may use the Code default
system "as to the personal property.""2 9 In many cases this will
be feasible and perhaps desirable; dispositions of inventory and
accounts may well bring better returns under the Code plan.
Where consumer goods and equipment are included within an
agreement covering both real and personal property, a fixture
problem may arise. First, is it necessary to decide whether the
fixture is real or personal property? If the secured party wishes
to proceed under the Code, section 9-313 seems to authorize the
use of the default rules of Part 5.0 On the other hand, if the
secured party wishes to utilize the real estate techniques to fore-
close on the fixture, there is an argument that fixtures do not
fall into either the real or personal property classifications. Com-
monly, we may think that use of the real and personal property
terminology creates a perfect dichotomy, but the fact that the
Code purports to leave to the prior law the question of what is
a fixture may create a third category.211 If the real property
foreclosure proceedings reach fixtures apart from the Code, the
practical basis suggested for the special rule of section 9-501(4)
would seem to require authorization for a realty foreclosure as
to real estate, personal property, and fixtures. Neither speed nor
simplicity results from requiring a separate disposition for fix-
tures.212
VII. JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
A. JUDICIAL SALES AND FORECLOSURE ACTIONS
When the debtor is in default, the secured party has the option
under the Code either to sue for the debt or to foreclose on the
208. § 9-501, comment 5, indicates that the Code is indifferent on
the question of the realty remedies permitting separate proceedings for
personalty.
209. § 9-501(4).
210. This conclusion is only an inference from § 9-313(5), which per-
mits a secured party to remove his collateral from the realty, subject to
the provisions of Part 5.
211. With the exception of bricks and mortar-type material, which the
Code excludes from its fixture rule, § 9-313(1) purports to leave the
determination of whether property becomes a fixture to state law. How-
ever, § 9-313(5) rejects any "material injury" test for establishing the
right to remove, and this may change the law of fixtures in several juris-
dictions. See Coogan, Security Interests in Fixtures Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1319, 1343-49 (1962).
212. The suggestion has been made that the draftsmen may have de-
liberately omitted fixtures because an "ordinary real estate mortgagee who
had made no separate fixture filing should not be able to take advantage
of its removal rights." Coogan, supra note 211, at 1350 n.46.
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collateral in a judicial proceeding.213 If a judgment is obtained
on the basic claim, then the secured party may enforce that judg-
ment against the collateral by a levy of execution.2- 1 Because
of the costs-involved, the secured party will usually seek to realize
on his claim without the aid of the courts, but there are advantages
to judicial proceedings. One is that the secured party need not be
concerned with the application of a doctrine of election of rem-
edies.21" The Code explicitly makes the lien obtained through
levy of execution relate back to the date of perfection of the se-
curity interest.216 The levy is recognized as one means of en-
forcing the security interest and not as a separate and inconsistent
method of collecting the underlying debt.-17
B. AvoIDING POWERS IN BANKRUPTCY
Because of the Code rule on election, even though the debtor
becomes bankrupt within four months of the levy of execution,
213. § 9-501(1). A secured party, such as a pawnbroker, apparently
may agree in advance to rely only on the collateral. 2 NEW YORK LAW
REVISION COMMISSION, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
N.Y. Leg. Doe. No. 65, at 2028 (1955).
214. § 9-501(5).
215. Election can operate at two levels. In the development of the
conditional sale, the courts permitted the seller to seize the goods or to sue
for the price. Repossession results in loss of any right to a deficiency or
redemption because it is classified as a rescission; the suit for the price
confirms the title in the buyer. This exclusiveness of each remedy was
developed without much rational basis. See Warren, Statutory Damages
and the Conditional Sale, 20 OHIO ST. L.i. 289, 291 (1959). See the
rule in operation in Yellow Mfg. Acceptance Corp. v. Handler, 249 Minn.
539, 83 N.W.2d 103 (1957). Apart from this kind of exclusiveness of
remedy, the doctrine of election of remedies operates to bar a shift from
one remedy to another, inconsistent remedy on the basis of estoppel or
waiver. Cf. First Nat'l Bank v. Flynn, 190 Minn. 102, 250 N.W. 806
(1933). The Code rejects both notions. §§ 9-202, -501.
216. This is another drawback to the unperfected security interest, which
is generally of little value. It is worthless in bankruptcy. See § 9-301.
"Perfection" is a basic Code concept. Normally a security interest is per-
fected by filing or by taking possession of the collateral, but there are
exceptions whereby certain transactions are perfected without filing. See
§ 9-302. It is important to realize that perfection cannot occur until the
security has "attached," that is, until there is a pledge or an aereement.
value is given, and the debtor has rights in the collateral. §§ 9-204,
-303. Furthermore, § 9-203 requires evidence of the agreement either
by a transfer of possession or by a writing.
217. Under an earlier, less clear version of § 9-501, proceeding by
levy was held to be a binding election of one remedy inconsistent with
realization under a filed security agreement; this decision was rever-ed
when no inconsistency wds found between the two remedies. In re Adrian
Research & Chem. Co.. 169 F. Sunp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1958). rv'd. *740
F.2d 734 (3d Cir. 1959). See Note, 1 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 236
(1959); Note, 1959 DUKE L.J. 640; 32 TEMP. L.Q. 348 (1959); 107 U. PA.
L. REV. 1230 (1959).
19621 249
MINNESOTA LA W REVIEW
the trustee in bankruptcy should not be able to use his power to
avoid liens obtained by legal proceedings within four months of
bankruptcy.21 Further, the trustee should not be able to assert
that the lien is a transfer for antecedent debt within the preference
provision of the Bankruptcy Act.219
One warning should be noted here. The Code is silent on the
question of the relation back of liens obtained by attachment or
other proceedings prior to the suit for the judgment. If the debtor
becomes a bankrupt within four months after an attachment by
the secured party, may the trustee in bankruptcy claim that his
avoiding powers upset the attachment and that the attachment
constituted an election of inconsistent remedies? That well-worn
maxim of statutory interpretation, expressio unius, exclusio alteritts,
gives force to such an argument, particularly where state law recog-
nized a doctrine of election prior to the Code. In addition, the
approach is strengthened by the fact that the preliminary and
provisional quality of an attachment lien makes it necessarily less
potent than the judgment lien, which is the consequence of judicial
action and usually comes only after a hearing on the merits. On
the other hand, after judgment any lien arising from execution
is usually given priority from the date of attachment.22 One
can thus argue that the liens created by judicial process prior to
judgment are merely the initial steps to a judicial sale pursuant
to execution, which the Code equates to a foreclosure.22' This
argument, rejecting technical distinctions among various kinds of
liens created by judicial process, seems sensible.2 It also has
the virtue of eliminating one further difficulty in the bankruptcy
context.
C. BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION OVER FORECLOSURE
Even if the secured party has a security interest that is not
218. Bankruptcy Act § 67a, 66 Stat. 427 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 107(a)(1958). Here the original contractual lien is perfected and is more thanfour months old at bankruptcy even though the levy is within four months.
219. Bankruptcy Act §§ 60, 1(30), 52 Stat. 869 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 96(1958). Although judicial liens come within the definition of transfer, the
valid and otherwise unassailable prior lien enforced by judgment is not
a transfer within four months. Burns v. Artcraft Painting Co., 103 N.H.
118, 116 A.2d 699 (1960); Utah Ass'n of Credit Men v. Jones, 49 Utah519, 164 Pac. 1029 (1917). But cf. Cohen v. Hodes, 54 F.2d 680 (E.D.N.Y.
1931) (mortgage itself invalid). See generally 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY
60.11 (14th ed. 1962).
220. 5 AM. JuR. Attachment § 829 (1936, Supp. 1962).
221. § 9-501(5).
222. This nontechnical approach is buttressed by § 9-502, permitting
repossession by "action," which could include attachment and other forms
of mesne or provisional process.
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defeasible by the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy, the secured party
may not commence judicial foreclosure proceedings after the
petition in bankruptcy has been filed without the consent of the
bankruptcy court.2 If the secured party has attached the col-
lateral but has not yet obtained a judgment, has he initiated fore-
closure proceedings prior to bankruptcy so as to preclude bank-
ruptcy administration of his collateral? A stringently literal reading
of section 9-501, limiting foreclosure proceedings only to situa-
tions where a judgment lien was obtained, should be rejected.
Such an approach will result only in an increase in the tension
between the state and federal system and in confusion in pre-
dicting the rights of the parties.2 '
D. JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE AND ARTICLE 9
Another advantage stemming from proceedings to a judicial sale
pursuant to a judgment on the debt stems from the fact that the
Code makes such a sale a foreclosure, and the secured party is
free to "purchase at the sale and thereafter hold the collateral
free of any other requirements of this Article. ' 12 As the comment
to section 9-501 suggests, the quoted language probably means
that a judicial sale is entirely governed by law outside the Code.220
Consequently, this kind of proceeding frees the secured party from
all of the terms of Article 9, including the obligations to send
notices to the debtor and certain other secured parties under
section 9-504(3); to assure that every aspect of the disposition,
including the method, manner, time, place and terms, are com-
mercially reasonable under section 9-504(3); to apply the sur-
plus proceeds to any junior secured party's claim under section
9-504(1); to conduct any compulsory resale of consumer goods
within ninety days under section 9-505(1); and to propose to
retain the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation secured under
section 9-505(2). Further, the secured party purchasing at a
judicial sale is apparently also free of any Code requirement pro-
tecting the debtor's equity of redemption under section 9-506
or imposing liability upon the secured party for failure to comply
with part 5 under section 9-507.
Although the statute is literally silent on the question of this
kind of freedom of action in the judicial sale to a third party pur-
chaser, there is even less reason to hold a stranger to the secured
223. Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co., 282 U.S. 734 (1931); Lockhart
v. Garden City Bank & Trust Co., 116 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1940).
224. See 2 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 23.15 (14th ed. 1962). See generally
MACLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY §§ 215-16 (1956).
225. § 9-501(5).
226. § 9-501(5), comment 6.
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transaction to the listed requirements of Article 9.2"7 Here the
explanatory comment to section 9-501 (5) indicates that the
language apparently limiting the liberating provision to cases where
the secured party purchases is aimed at emphasizing the freedom
given to the secured party to purchase at a judicial sale.
Unfortunately, ambiguity as to the group protected is not the
only difficulty presented by section 9-501 (5). In indicating that
the requirements of Article 9 do not bind the secured party where
there is a judicial sale, this section implies that any benefits of
Article 9 may be retained by the purchaser at the sale. One such
benefit may be found in section 9-504(4), which could be used
to rebut any argument based upon the traditional notions of
caveat emptor related to judicial sales.22s Contrary to this ap-
proach is the language of section 9-504(4), which protects a
purchaser for value "when collateral is disposed of by a secured
party." This language can and should be read to exclude judicial
sales from the subsection since any other reading unfairly im-
pairs the claims of a junior secured party. Under the nonjudicial
disposition requirements of section 9-504, certain junior secured
parties are entitled to notice and may claim any surplus after
payment of the debt and expenses of resale.2 9 Consequently,
there is little harm in the further provision that a purchaser for
value at such a private disposition takes free of the rights of the
debtor and of the rights of any subordinate security interests.
No such requirement attends the execution-type foreclosure, and
consequently, the purchasers for value at such sales should receive
only what the state procedural law confers upon them.23 They
should not be permitted to come ahead of the earlier junior
lien creditors where no provision is made for protecting the in-
terest of those creditors. Otherwise, the sale to satisfy a rela-
tively small senior debt may deprive the junior creditors of their
security.
227. § 9-504(4) protects such purchasers in Code-regulated dispositions.
See text accompanying notes 130 & 131 supra.
228. Not much protection is given to such purchasers, since usually
the courts apply the caveat emptor philosophy to purchasers at execution
sales. 20 MINN. L. REV. 557 (1936). Compare UNIFORM SALES ACT
§ 13 with § 2-312. Some relaxation of this view affords the purchaser
protection and permits recovery of the price from the judgment creditor,
the judgment debtor, or both, upon the basis of unjust enrichment. Annot.,
68 A.L.R. 659 (1930); 6 CORNELL L.Q. 205 (1921). If the purchaser can
show that he is protected against the defect in title by recording acts, he
may prevail. Note, 24 MINN. L. REV. 805 (1940).
229. See text accompanying note 120 supra.
230. See note 228 supra.
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CONCLUSION
An evaluation of the Code default provisions must await more
case development."m Probably the greatest impact of these pro-
visions will occur in two areas.
First, the Code provides the first truly integrated system for
realization by secured parties. For example, no longer will the
choice of the form of conditional sale or chattel mortgage have
serious consequences upon the rights of the parties on default.
More than any other part of Article 9, the default rules are really
stated on an integrated basis. In most jurisdictions, this will also
mean that the Code will supply for the first time detailed standards
for transactions now covered by such devices as the factor's lien
and assignments of accounts receivable. Only on a few occasions
does the Code create a special rule for particular kinds of col-
lateral.
The second area where the Code will have a substantial effect
rests more in what the statute does not state than upon what it
does state. The attempt to provide flexible, effective, and efficient
realization procedures hopefully will result in fewer deficiencies
and more realistic resale prices.m 2 Lawyers should not stand in
fear of the Code's standard of "commercial reasonableness"; stat-
utes are not able to decide cases-that is the job of the courts.
The law has thrived for centuries with a standard of reasonable-
ness, intelligently applied by the judiciary. It seems likely that we
will be able to endure the extension of that standard to default
proceedings.
231. For a collection of Code cases dealing with Article 9, see Del
Duca, Commercial Code Litigation, 66 DicK. L. RaV. 39, 72 (1961).
232. One able commentator suggests:
The theory of the law has been that the way to protect a de-
faulting debtor is to have a public sale of his automobile or other
collateral. Everybody knows in practice that public sales are usually
perfunctory, and nobody bids but the creditor. Not only that, but
there never would have been a sale if the debtor had any equity to
protect; if he had had any equity, he would have sold the goods him-
self to salvage his equity, rather than go into default, or he would have
found substitute financing.
Kripke, Kentucky Modernizes the Law of Chattel Security, 48 Ky. LJ.
369, 385-86 (1960).
19621 253

